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In this study, I examine the influence of human rights considerations on the 
US foreign aid decisionmaking process during the war on terror and, for 
comparative purposes, prior to its onset.  The findings indicate that respect 
for human rights has been negatively related to the yes/no decision to allocate 
economic aid and the amount allocated since 9/11.  In other words, more 
economic aid has flowed—and more readily—to regimes with poor human 
rights records since the onset of the war on terror.  The findings also indicate 
that human rights considerations failed to influence post-9/11 military aid 
decisions.  While these findings run counter to the Congressionally-mandated 
positive relationship between human rights and foreign aid, and my own 
  
expectations of American exceptionalism in the guise of human rights 
promotion, additional analysis indicates they were not a first.  I also found 
that respect for human rights was negatively related to economic aid 
allocations under every administration since Reagan’s and during the post-
Cold War era. Only during the Cold War, and only for military aid, di better 
human rights practices increase the prospects of a regime receiving aid.  In 
analyzing allocations to partners and non-partners in the war on terror, I 
found that human rights considerations negatively influenced decisions on 
economic aid amounts for both groups but only the yes/no decision for 
military aid allocations to partners.  Looking across the models, and taking 
into account the influence of the control variables, one possible explanation 
for the lack of positive findings on the human rights variable becomes 
apparent: other, competing considerations—namely addressing recipient 
“need,” promoting democracy, and confronting perceived threats to national 
security—regularly overshadow human rights concerns, leading US 
decisionmakers to extend aid to regimes with questionable human rights
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
From Controversy to Consensus and Back Again1 
In response to growing calls that US policy abroad ought to promote the 
rights and protections ordinary Americans enjoy at home, Congress in 1976 
amended the Foreign Assistance Act to make promotion of “increased respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world” a keygoal of 
the US foreign aid program (Section 502B: 230).2  US law has since required 
foreign aid decisionmakers to restrict the flow of economic and military aid to 
countries perpetrating human rights abuses unless “extraordinary 
circumstances,” which Congress left largely undefined, dictate otherwise (231).3  
The law immediately attracted the attention of international relations (IR) 
scholars, with McKinlay and Little’s (1977) early finding that “human needs” 
play no role in an allocation process predicated on the self-serving interests of 
“power-political and security concerns” sparking significant debate (80).  By the 
late-1990s, however, this debate had given way to consensus.  Scholars 
generally agreed that human rights considerations influenced US foreign aid 
                                                
1 The analysis and findings presented in this manuscript are the author’s alone, as are any errors 
or omissions, and should in no way be construed to reflect negatively on those who so graciously 
and patiently served as dissertation committee members or reviewers. 
2 Congress two years earlier included a “Sense of Congress” statement in the Foreign Assistance 
Act requesting that the president curtail the flow f aid to governments committing gross human 
rights violations.  Not until 1976, however, did Congress drop the Sense of Congress statement 
to make the language legally binding on US foreign aid decisionmakers (Apodaca 2005).  
3 “Extraordinary circumstances,” sometimes referred to as “emergency situations,” historically 
have involved the allocation of aid to countries on the basis of what US decisionmakers consider 
an overriding US strategic or national security objective.  The Reagan administration’s 
allocation in 1983 of an additional $55 million in aid to El Salvador over Congressional 
objections probably is the most oft-cited example in literature—qualitative and quantitative—on 





decisionmaking, though the magnitude and direction of that influence fluctuated 
in light of countervailing strategic, ideological, economic, and humanitarian 
concerns (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1991 and 1992; Abrams and 
Lewis 1993; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Callaway and Matthews 2008).  This 
consensus appeared poised to deepen, and the influence of human rights on aid 
allocations set to grow, as the threat of communism faded and US 
decisionmakers redirected increasing amounts of foreign aid to consolidating 
post-Cold War democratic transitions, fostering Middle East peace, nd 
promoting good governance initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewher  
(Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Korb 2008; Clark and O’Connor 1997; Stark 
2000; Apodaca 2006).    
With yet another shift in US foreign policy priorities, this time in 
response to Al-Qaeda’s attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon, the consensus was lost and controversy again ensued.  To be sure, th
shift toward countering the threat of international terrorism “focused urgently—
and rightly—on protecting Americans and preventing further attacks” 
(Massimino 2000: 23).  For many, however, the shift also raised serious 
concerns about the United States’ commitment to promoting human rights 
abroad and the future of human rights as a US foreign policy goal.  As 
paraphrased by IR scholars and human rights observers, these concerns have 
been articulated as distinct but overlapping arguments that today represent the 
conventional wisdom on the issue: some argue that the George W. Bush 




and political foil but, practically speaking, cast the issue aside in pursuit of Al-
Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates (Mertus 2005; Apodaca 2006).  In the 
administration’s response to the attacks, so their argument goes, “th  promotion 
of human rights [became] one of the major casualties of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks” (Acharya 2008: i).  Others tend to focus not on the Bush administration 
but the war on terror itself, asserting that its onset marked a new era in US 
foreign policy hostile human rights promotion.  They argue that the “era of 
human rights ended shortly after September 11, 2001,” when countering the 
threat of international terrorism became the United States’ overarching foreign 
policy paradigm (Mertus 2008: 1).  Since the onset of the war on terror, the 
human rights gains of the 1970s, including those embodied in the human rights 
provision, have been in the “process of being dismantled, as security concerns 
have taken precedence over human rights abuses” (Christie 2008: 16).  Still 
others focus on the Bush administration’s division of the world into countries 
that were “either with us or against us” in the war on terror (Bush 2001).  This 
third group argues President Bush’s ultimatum created a double standard i  US 
human rights policy whereby decisionmakers disregard human rights 
considerations when allocating aid to countries that partnered with the Unit d 
States in the war on terror but held others to the standard mandated by the 
human rights provision (Ingatieff 2005; Weiss, Crahan, and Goering 2004; 
Callaway and Matthews 2008).  The implication is that human rights 
considerations failed to influence US foreign aid allocations to all but non-




decisionmakers perceive international terrorists are capable of mounting attacks 
against the US homeland (Forsythe 2006; Christie 2008). 
Interestingly, and despite their variation, each of these arguments 
assumes the war on terror is best understood as constituting a set of 
extraordinary circumstances under the Foreign Assistance Act, if not officially 
than in practice.4  That is to say, each argues that the war on terror severed, to 
varying degrees, the Congressionally-mandated relationship between human 
rights and US foreign aid allocations.  Yet, despite the moral and legal 
implications of these arguments, to the author’s knowledge no study has used 
them as a springboard for an empirical analysis of the post-9/11 linkage between 
human rights and US foreign aid.    
The Research Puzzle 
This study seeks to provide that analysis.  In so doing, my aim is neither 
to promote nor undermine any one of the arguments sketched above.  Rather, it 
is to examine their generalizability and advance scholarly knowledge in this 
small but important subfield of US foreign policy studies.  By filling in some of 
the first pieces of the research puzzle that is the relationship between human 
rights and US foreign aid in the “Age of Sacred Terror,” I also hope this study 
will pique scholarly interest and spur more vibrant debate on this issue 
(Benjamin and Simon 2002: i).   
                                                
4 The Foreign Assistance Act requires the president to certify in writing that extraordinary 
circumstances exist and warrant the allocation of US foreign aid to a country involved in human 
rights violations.  However, presidents, including Carter, who signed the human rights provision 
into law, have been able to sidestep this requirement due to a number of defects in the human 




I search for pieces of this puzzle in a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
(PCTS) dataset spanning a “global” sample of countries for the years 1977-
2008, the most comprehensive to date.  By including years prior to the onset of 
the war on terror, I embed my analysis in historical and comparative perspective, 
which provides for a deeper understanding and more robust discussion of post-
9/11 US foreign aid decisionmaking.  My primary goal is to answer th  
following set of research questions derived from the arguments outlined above:  
did the Bush administration jettison human rights considerations during the US 
foreign aid allocation process?  If so, was this disregard for human rights 
considerations a historical first? Or, have past administrations b und by Section 
502B of the Foreign Assistance Act also set aside these considerations?  Did this 
jettisoning reverse an otherwise positive trend in the relationship between 
human rights and US foreign aid?   Is there evidence to suggest that the war on 
terror represents an “era” in US foreign aid decisionmaking, one that altered the 
previously-established relationship between human rights and aid?  If so, how 
does the human rights-foreign aid linkage during the war on terror compare to 
the Cold War and post-Cold War era?  Did US foreign aid decisionmakers 
ignore human rights abuses by partners in the war on terror while penalizing 
those of non-partners?  On balance, what do the answers to these questions say 
about the war on terror as a set of extraordinary circumstances d the prospects 
for human rights considerations to influence US foreign aid decisionmaki g as 




Significance of This Study 
In providing empirical answers to the research questions highlighted in 
the previous section, this study adds to the cumulative knowledge and scholarly 
understanding of the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid i  
several ways.  Only one quantitative study, Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz’s 
(2009), addresses post-9/11 US foreign aid allocations, but only in passi g since 
the authors’ focus was the nexus between US economic aid allocations nd 
democracy promotion.  From a quantitative standpoint, then, this study squarely 
places human rights and US foreign aid allocations during the war on terror as 
the focus of inquiry.  Additionally, I make in this study the novel contribution of 
analyzing the human rights-US foreign aid linkage for two previously 
unexamined groups of aid recipients—partners and non-partners in the war on 
terror.  From a theoretical standpoint, I offer readers a study that speaks to the 
relative explanatory power of the three IR approaches that have dominated the 
study of human rights and US foreign aid for more than four decades (Lai 2003; 
Barratt 2008; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Robinson and Finn 2000).5   The 
first, which Congress had in mind when noting that human rights, in “keeping 
with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States,” should be a 
“principal goal of US foreign policy,” is the positivist school ofAmerican 
exceptionalism (P.L. 87-195, 230).6   American exceptionalism traditionally 
                                                
5 In fairness to the theories in question, I only sketch the broad contours of what may be 
considered the common understanding of these theories in the human rights-US foreign aid 
literature.  I leave the various, lesser known and used sub-strains of each theory that may apply 
to this vein of literature to future researchers.   
6  This school, “associated with Hamilton and most presidents since Woodrow Wilson, would 




takes inspiration from President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, known as the
“Four Points” speech, in which he called for expanding the US foreign a d 
program beyond rebuilding post-World War II Europe to facilitating the
transition of African and Asian countries from colonial possessions to 
independent and functioning members of the international community (Hattori 
2003; Veillette 2008; Thorbecke 2000).  While recognizing other considerations 
influence the aid allocation process, American exceptionalism in its purest form 
contends that the process is at heart a humanitarian endeavor aimed at promoting 
international peace and prosperity (Hattori 2003; Callaway and Matthews 2008).  
As Hattori (2003) points out, studies in this liberal tradition proceed from three 
ethical tenants that are missing in its two main theoretical rivals:  
the first identifies foreign aid as an “imperfect obligation” of the 
industrialized to the “less developed” states to provide “basic needs,” 
which are identified as fundamental human rights…the second ethical 
justification identifies foreign aid as a moral response to problems that 
can be remedied with technical expertise…finally, foreign aid is 
identified as embodying the ideal of humanitarianism (230).    
 
Understood as such, foreign aid is akin to a gift of money, materiel, o  
technical expertise to a less fortunate member of the international community 
(Williams 2000).  The upshot of this approach is that US foreign aid’s purpose is 
to promote American liberal values, such as respect for individual rights, 
democratic norms, and the rule of law abroad and thus improve the human 
condition on a global scale (Lai 2003; Lipset 1996; Gaddis 1992; McCormick 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumption that US impact would be for the better” (Forsythe 2006: 161).  To be sure, though, 
there is an “alternative, negative kind of exceptionalism, namely, unilateralism and 
disengagement from international cooperation” that is more commonly highlighted in the 
qualitative analysis of human rights and US foreign aid (Powell 2008: 107).   Mertus (2008), for 
example, emphasizes this negative exceptionalism in her study when she argues that the United 
States has held disfavored countries to higher human rights standards while ignoring the abuses 




and Mitchell 1998; Forsythe and Beetham 1995; Monten 2005; Callaway and 
Matthews 2008).   Proponents of this approach tend to view its precepts as 
holding, or at least holding their own, in the face of other considerations known 
to influence aid allocations irrespective of presidential administrat on or era in 
decisionmaking (Walldorf 2008).  
 The second approach, realism, lays out the familiar counterargument 
that US decisionmakers allocate foreign aid to secure political support abroad 
for the purpose of enhancing US national security (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 
1962).  Whereas “allocating foreign assistance on the basis of ethical 
considerations [inherent to the American exceptionalism approach] suggests a 
positive relationship between aid and respect for human rights, one does not 
expect improved respect for human rights from the allocations of foreign 
assistance on the basis of donor self-interest [upon which realism is founded]” 
(Callaway and Matthews 2008: 26).  Following this logic, realists argue that US 
decisionmakers generally allocate foreign aid to security partners, such as treaty 
allies and partners in the war on terror, irrespective of their human rights records 
(Hattori 2003).    
The third, and perhaps the least employed approach in the literature, the 
pluralist-business approach, asserts that US foreign aid decisionmaking is based 
on preferences of politically powerful domestic interest groups (McKeown 
1984).  Most studies employing this orientation view the US business 
community, particularly US multinational corporations (MNCs), as the dominate 




cajole US decisionmakers into funneling foreign aid to countries based on 
economic interests and trade relations rather than human rights or secu ity 
concerns (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998).  In addition to evaluating the 
relative utility of these theoretical approaches, I also evaluate the merits of my 
own pragmatic version of American exceptionalism, which I outline in detail in 
the next section. 
In addition to my primary and secondary goals of providing insight into 
the human rights-foreign aid linkage since the onset of the war on terror and 
evaluating the relative utility of the theories of aid decisionmaking mentioned 
above, respectively, I also address a number of topics that may be of int rest to 
US policymakers.  These topics include: trends in US foreign aid allocations; the 
relative importance over time of key considerations on US foreign aid 
decisionmaking; historical adherence (or lack thereof) to the human rights 
requirements enumerated in Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act; and 
the overall influence of human rights on the foreign aid allocation process.  
Having a deeper understanding of these issues could make for more informed 
US foreign aid decisionmaking in the future.  Additionally, US decisionmakers 
interested in promoting respect for human rights and American exceptionalism 
may find my analysis of considerations that have tended to trump the two during 
the foreign aid allocation process of particular interest. 
Finally, I have a practical contribution in mind for this study.  US foreign 
aid is a scarce resource and its allocation a trust between the American people 




In a 1994 article published in Human Rights Quarterly, Poe, Pilatovsky, 
Ogundele, and I expressed a belief that the American public deserves to know 
how foreign aid decisionmakers are spending US taxpayer dollars and 
portraying American interests abroad. I believe this contribution is today too 
often overlooked in the literature, and I seek to advance it again on behalf of my 
late mentor, Dr. Steven C. Poe, and other coauthors.  If ordinary Americans 
want their elected representatives to embrace American exceptionalism, to 
follow the letter and spirit of the human rights provision and, in so doing, use 
foreign aid to promote respect for human rights throughout the world, I hope this 
study informs them of how we, as a nation, are faring and what need be done if 
we are to achieve this lofty goal.     
Theoretical Orientation 
The theoretical orientation I employ in this study is the same that I relied 
on in the 1994 article.  I approach the relationship between human rights and US 
foreign aid from the positivist school of American exceptionalism.  However, 
my approach differs from the purist variant outlined in the previous section.  I 
reject the assumption that regards the “United States as an exception in the midst 
of a violent and immoral world” when allocating foreign aid (Wipfler 1979: 
183).  I assume instead that the United States is a willing, forceful, and primarily 
self-interested participant in that world and that US foreign aid decisionmaking 
reflects this reality.  Consequently, and not surprisingly, I also reject the claim 
that US foreign aid is best regarded as a gift predicated on US decisionmakers’ 




my understanding of American exceptionalism, but only in cases of 
overwhelming recipient need—as in the aftermath of natural disaster —in the 
guise of humanitarian assistance.   
 As the opening sentence of this chapter suggests, I envision American 
exceptionalism as an outgrowth of the uneven but growing acceptance and, by 
the late-1960s, entrenchment of human rights norms in the US electorat . This 
entrenchment, I contend, took root on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement 
and amid growing popular discontent with the Vietnam War and the seemingly 
amoral foreign policy decisions of the Nixon administration (Lumsdaine 1993; 
Sunstein 1997; Holsti 2000; Forsythe 2000).  The culmination of this 
entrenchment was the election in the mid-1970s of decisionmakers willing to 
advance and, ultimately, adopt into law the human rights provision. Thus, I 
regard the provision incorporation into the Foreign Assistance Act as a r tional 
response by elected representatives to citizens’ demands for the expression of 
morality in US foreign policy.  As Finnamore (1998), then, I site th  origin of 
this norm “not in preexisting state interests but in strongly held principled ideas 
(ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those idea ” to 
avoid repeating foreign policy missteps of the past (518).   
In the decades since the adoption of the human rights provision, “moral 
entrepreneurs”—the same ordinary Americans and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that secured that adoption—have continued to advance 
these ideas and elect representatives who share their values and norms 




Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, enable their efforts, as have 
Congressional reporting requirements on the executive branch concerning 
human rights conditions abroad.  Against these electoral and institutional 
backdrops, US rhetoric in support of human rights has been translated into 
foreign aid reality (Poe et al. 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Poe 1991 and 
1992; Abrams and Lewis 1993; Holsti 2000).  This translation is all the mor  
noteworthy, as are the efforts of these entrepreneurs, since the human rights 
provision is effectively nonbinding, owing to a variety of definitional 
deficiencies, vagaries, and loopholes in the Congressional language.7        
With this theoretical orientation in mind, I content that America has 
exhibited genuine exceptionalism in US foreign aid-giving despit the overall 
self-serving nature of the allocation process.  This exceptionalism has been 
manifest in the positive influence of human rights and other humanitari -
related considerations, such as recipient need and democracy promotion, on 
foreign aid decisionmaking.  While this influence has not been as consistent or 
strong as purist variants of the American exceptionalism contend (lt alone 
reached a “tipping point” that affords them anything close to a taken-for-granted 
status), I view human rights considerations as embedded in and influencing the 
allocation process.  Moreover, despite giving way to other considerations and 
subject to setback, I regard human rights considerations as resilient and 
occupying the moral high ground in the US foreign aid narrative thanks to the 
ongoing efforts of moral entrepreneurs (Sunstein 1997; Finnamore and Sikkink 
                                                
7 For a concise and excellent overview of these defects, see Clair Apodaca’s 2005 article, “US 
Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short His ory,” in Ritsumeikan International 




1998).  For the purposes of this study, the issue is whether these entrepr eurs 
succeeded—through the human rights provision and ongoing pressure—in 
securing the influence of human rights considerations on post-9/11 aid 
allocations or whether the United States sacrificed the “human rights of others to 
advance its own security and prosperity” after the onset of the war on terror 
(Forsythe 2006: 6).  
 
Expected Results 
I anticipate finding that the influence of human rights considerations on 
US foreign aid decisions diminished somewhat as decisionmakers reorient d aid 
toward advancing the war on terror.  However, and in contrast to the arguments 
that spurred this study, I also anticipate finding that human rights con iderations 
survived the 9/11 attacks and were positively related to aid allocations.  In 
looking forward to the empirical models in Chapters 4-6, I expect to find that 
greater respect for human rights—and, for that matter, increases in other 
indicators of American exceptionalism—exerted a positive influence on the 
Bush administration’s foreign aid allocations, though strategic concerns a e 
likely to prove more influential.  I also anticipate finding the human rights-
foreign aid linkage under his administration represents less of a break with past 
administration’s practices than the conventional wisdom and the arguments that 
inform it permit.  When examining post-9/11 aid allocations as the outgrow h of 
a new “era” in US foreign policy, I expect to find that human rights 
considerations had a positive effect on allocation decisions and that this effect 




finding that the US decisionmakers did not institute a human rights double 
standard when allocating aid to partners and non-partners in the war on te ror.  
Taken together, then, I anticipate rejecting most of the hypotheses explicated in 
the next chapter, which are worded consistent with critics’ arguments about the 
human rights-foreign aid linkage during the war on terror and, thus, at odds with 
my own rather pragmatic version of American exceptionalism.   
 
Outline of Chapters 
To determine whether the arguments sketched above are grounded in 
empirical “reality,” I proceed in the coming chapters as follows: in Chapter 2, I 
take stock of the empirical literature on the relationship between human rights 
and US foreign aid.  In the process, I identify the conceptual and methodological 
issues and selection of variables that will facilitate construction of well-specified 
quantitative models of US foreign aid decisionmaking.  Toward the end of 
Chapter 2, I offer and discuss a set of hypotheses derived from the research 
questions highlighted above.  I provide in Chapter 3 an overview of the data and 
methods used to construct and test these hypotheses.  Chapters 4-6 are the
empirical chapters.  In Chapter 4, I present and discuss the findings for models 
of the human rights-foreign aid linkage under the George W. Bush 
administration and its predecessors.  In Chapters 5 and 6, I do likewise for 
models of eras in decisionmaking and partners and non-partners in the war, 
respectively.  I use Chapter 7 to synthesize the overall findings of this study.  In 




findings advance scholarly knowledge of the US foreign aid allocation process.  
To further the secondary goal of this study, I also evaluate in Chapter 7 the 
utility of the theories typically employed to explain US foreign aid allocations, 
including my own.  Finally, I offer suggestions for future research and conclude 
with a final word on American exceptionalism and the need for moral 
entrepreneurs to continue to push to elevate human rights considerations to 
greater prominence.  With this roadmap in mind, I now turn to a review of the 









In Chapter 1, I briefly discussed the impetus for this study—three 
common arguments about the linkage (actually lack thereof) between human 
rights and US foreign aid allocations during the war on terror—and my primary 
goal of investigating that linkage via empirical analysis.  To advance this goal, I 
presented a research puzzle—consisting of three sets of research questions 
inspired by those arguments—and outlined a research design that promises to 
fill in pieces of that puzzle.  I also highlighted the three main theoretical 
orientations typically employed by scholars when analyzing the relationship 
between human rights and US foreign aid, in addition to my understanding of 
American exceptionalism, and my secondary goal of evaluating their relative 
explanatory power.        
The purpose of this chapter is to examine past multivariate studies for 
conceptual and methodological innovations and variables that will ensure I 
begin to construct well-specified models of US foreign aid decisionmaking in 
Chapter 3.8  My review of the literature unfolds in three sections.  Owing to the 
                                                
8 My review is not exhaustive. The literature on human rights and US foreign aid has exploded 
over the last decade, owing in large part to concerns about the war on terror.  Since this is a 
quantitative analysis of US foreign aid decisionmaking, I have opted to highlight only those 
multivariate studies that directly examine the influence of human rights considerations on aid 
allocations.  Moreover, I limit my inquiry to studies published since Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello’s (1985) study, which introduced the two-stage decisionmaking model that has come 
to dominate the analysis of US foreign aid and spurred much of the subsequent interest in the 




point-counterpoint progression of the literature, particularly early on, the review 
proceeds chronologically.  The first section examines the studie of those 
scholars whose exchanges in the mid-1980s set the tone for the ongoing debate
over the influence of human rights on US foreign aid allocations.  The second 
section highlights a more recent and diverse set of scholars who have joined the 
debate since the early-2000s.  The last section synthesizes the findings of the 
literature review to assist in the explication of hypotheses.  With this progression 
in mind, I turn to the scholarly debate at the heart of this chapter.  
A Debate on Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Begins… 
In an effort to address the methodological shortcomings or 
misspecifications of past studies, which consisted primarily of simple corr lation 
matrices and bivariate regression models (McKinlay and Little 1977; Carleton 
and Stohl 1985; Schoultz 1981), Cingranelli and Pasquarello in 1985 conducted 
one of the earliest and to date most controversial multivariate analyses of the 
relationship between human rights and US foreign aid decisionmaking.  Their 
primary contribution to the literature was the introduction of a two-stage 
conceptual model for analyzing the allocation process, which has since become 
an industry standard.  Based on interviews conducted in 1982 with 
Congresspersons and executive branch officials involved in the allocation 
process, the authors conceptualized US foreign aid decisionmaking as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
to that of Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), see Po ’s (1990) “Human Rights and US Foreign 
Aid: A Review of Quantitative Studies and Suggestions for Future Research,” in Human Rights 
Quarterly 12: 499-512.  For an excellent overview of quantittive studies that include aid donors 
other than the United States, including multilateral institutions, see Neumayer’s (2003) The 




in the initial stage, US policy-makers performed a function analogous 
to “gatekeeping”; some countries were systematically excluded from 
the recipient pool, while others were passed on to the second stage of 
the decision process. In the second stage, policy-makers interacted to 
decide the level of assistance to provide (540). 
 
The authors went on to persuasively argue that past studies, in focusing 
exclusively on the second-stage level of assistance analysis, had effectively 
ignored the possibility that different considerations may exert more influence at 
one stage than the other.  The first stage of their analysis included all country-
years in the study, some 30 Latin American countries for the years 1979-82, 
with a dichotomous dependent variable; “1” denoted aid recipients in a g ven
year and “0” non-recipients.  The second stage, which included only recipient 
countries, used a continuous dependent variable representing the level of 
assistance US decisionmakers had allocated to these countries.  Using logit and 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate models for the gatekeeping and level of 
assistance stage, respectively, the authors observed for the first time a 
statistically significant relationship between human rights and military and 
economic aid.  Specifically, they showed that the Reagan administration used 
human rights criteria to deny countries military aid at the gatekeeping stage 
while rewarding the “relatively enlightened human rights practices” of recipient 
countries with greater levels of economic aid (560).  Recipient “need,” measured 
by a constellation of variables, including gross national product per capita 
(GNP), was shown to be the most important determinant of whether a country 
would pass the gatekeeping stage during the allocation of economic aid.  This 




the United States also played a statistically significant role in the initial yes/no 
gatekeeping decision to allocate aid.  In contrast to previous studie  like 
McKinlay and Little’s (1977), which tended to back realist explanatio s of aid 
allocations, American exceptionalism and the pluralist-business explanation thus 
found support in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage model. 
  Conceptual and methodological innovations notwithstanding, 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s study drew immediate (and justifiable) criticism 
from numerous scholars.  In perhaps the most significant critique and 
reappraisal, Carleton and Stohl (1987) drew attention to three shortcomings of 
the study.9  While accepting the utility of the two-stage allocation model, 
Carleton and Stohl (1987) took exception with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s 
(1985) operationalization of human rights based exclusively on US State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  Carleton and Stohl 
(1987) showed that a parallel scale of human rights constructed from Amnesty 
International information differed significantly on its coding for sme countries.  
This led the authors to surmise that the Country Reports suffered from a 
systemic political bias against leftist regimes, which Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 
demonstrated for the first time in 2001.10  Even more problematic in my 
estimation was Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) exclusion of El Salvador as 
                                                
9 The following year McCormick and Mitchell (1988) leveled a similar critique against 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985).  Their argument is not rehearsed here, however, since it 
largely mirrors that of Carleton and Stohl in terms of basic criticisms.  
10 The authors found that US State Department Country Reports tended to forgive allies’ human 
rights abuses but not those of leftist regimes.  They went on to say that this tendency had 
diminished between the years of 1976 to 1995 and hypot esized that it would continue to do so 
over time.  Moreover, they found that hypotheses that were consistent with critics’ claims about 
the inherent bias of Country Reports explained “only a very small percentage of the variance in 
the differences between the two reports [Country Reports and Amnesty International reports] 




a “non-routine” case of US foreign aid allocations (545).  Carleton and Stohl 
(1987) showed that the relationship between human rights and economic aid 
uncovered by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) disappeared entirely when 
they reinserted El Salvador into the model.  Carleton and Stohl went on to also 
criticize Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) for choosing to analyze only those 
US foreign aid programs that, in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s opinion, were 
clearly economic in nature and directly distributed by the US Government.  
Reanalyzing, as opposed to replicating, Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s analysis of 
economic aid at the second stage of the allocation process, but with aggreg te 
economic aid as the dependent variable, Carleton and Stohl (1987) found that 
there was no relationship between human rights and aid allocations.  They 
concluded their critique by arguing that Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) 
achieved their results only after questionable sampling techniques.  They closed 
by stating that Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s findings posed little challenge to 
previous correlation-based and bivariate findings supporting the realist 
explanation of aid-giving (Chomsky 1978; Schoultz 1981a and 1981b; Stohl, 
Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Carleton and Stohl 1985 and 1986). 
 Poe in 1991 challenged Carleton and Stohl’s (1987) findings.  Correcting for 
many of the sampling and variable-related shortcomings of Cingranelli d 
Pasquarello’s (1985) study, he reexamined the relationship between human 
rights and US military aid under the Carter and Reagan administrations in 1980 
and 1984, respectively, for two distinct groups: Western hemisphere countries 




departure from previous studies, and in an effort to ameliorate the then-
suspected biases of Country Report while more closely approximating the 
foreign aid decisionmaking process, Poe (1991) combined the human rights 
measures of Amnesty International and the State Department into a single 5-
point ordinal scale based on Stohl and Carleton’s (1985) coding rules.  He also 
included a second, but today rarely employed, human rights variable develop d 
by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) that tapped year-to-year changes in scores 
to determine whether the United States rewarded or punished countries as their 
human rights practices improve or worsen.  To this, he added several control 
variables, including what I consider an overly inclusive, conceptually muddled, 
and, by his own admission, crude “strategic importance” index11; the index 
consisted of a dummy variable for leftist and Marxist-oriented governments; a 
variable tapping a country’s tendency to comply with US interests, a  indicated 
by UN General Assembly roll call votes; a variable representing US bilateral 
economic interests (US exports to and imports from a country); and a measure 
of a country’s humanitarian need, represented by GNP per capita (207). Poe’s 
findings suggest that both the Carter and Reagan administration kept human 
rights abusers in the Western hemisphere from passing the gatekeeping stage of 
the aid allocation process.  Interestingly, and despite the still popular view that 
Carter made human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy agend  while 
                                                
11 The “strategic importance” index tapped whether a country was non-communist but bordering 
a communist neighbor; in the Western hemisphere, th United States’ traditional sphere of 
influence; hosted a US military presence of 500 or m e; had critical minerals that the US must 
obtain from abroad; or faced a violent threat from the left.  I believe components of the index 
would have been better tested separately before any such aggregation.  In any event, since its 
publication some of the index’s components have been shown to exert an independent influence 




Reagan generally deemphasized such concerns, the negative effect of abuses 
achieved moderate statistical significant (.05 level) only for the Reagan 
administration.  In contrast to Carter, the Reagan administration seemingly 
penalized human rights abuses at both the gatekeeping and level of assistance 
stage when allocating military aid.  Under both Carter and Reagan, and not 
surprisingly, leftist countries tended to pass the gatekeeping stage less often and 
to receive less aid than others in the West.  He also found that US 
decisionmakers favored needy countries in the Western hemisphere throughout 
the allocation process.  For the random sample of countries the findings were 
more robust, with human rights practices and recipient need influencing the 
initial decision to allocate aid and the amount allocated under both 
administrations. Having demonstrated the influence of human rights on military 
aid allocations, which I would add are arguably the tougher case since realist 
concerns likely inform much of the process, Poe again asserted an American 
exceptionalism explanation of US foreign aid decisionmaking.  He concluded by 
noting that “as a result of these findings it seems that the effect of human rights 
considerations on military aid can no longer be denied” (211).   
The next year Poe (1992) followed up his 1991 study with a parallel 
study on economic aid allocations, the only other difference of which was the 
inclusion of a control variable tapping a country’s population size in the level of 
assistance stage of the analysis.12  He found that under the Carter and Reagan 
                                                
12 Poe justified the inclusion of this variable by arguing that “it is reasonable to believe that the 
large the population of a country, the more dollars worth of aid that country will require to 
achieve the goals of the US government, ceteris paribus.  This reasoning, however, should not 




administration the human rights abuse variable was in the hypothesized positive 
direction for the Western hemisphere sample, though it achieved only weak 
statistical significance (0.1 level) and only in the case of Carter.  The variable 
tapping year-to-year change in human rights conditions in a country also verged 
on statistical significance under Carter, though as in the previous study failed to 
achieve it in any model.  Leftist countries were once again shown t  be less 
likely and needy countries more likely to pass the gatekeeping stage, with the 
latter achieving high statistical significance at the .01 level. At the second stage, 
recipient need dominated decisions.  However, neither the human rights nor he 
human rights change variable—though in the anticipated positive direction—
achieved significance.  For the random country sample, and at the gatekeeping 
stage, both the Carter and Reagan administrations considered need and 
penalized leftist governments during allocation decisions, with Carter also 
regarding trade and Reagan strategic importance of the country as significant 
too.  At the level of assistance stage, Poe first addressed the problem of an 
outlier in the dataset.  Egypt received massive amounts of aid in1980 and 1984.  
Unlike Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), who lacked theoretical justification 
for excluding El Salvador from their study, Poe took pains to justify Egypt’s 
exclusion.  He noted that Egypt’s higher than average economic aid levels were 
attributable to a unique historic event.  Both Egypt and Israel (which was not in 
the study) receive massive amounts of economic aid as a condition of he Camp 
David Accords, a pattern of allocations that continues today, though my 




been in a general and gradual decline (Tarnoff and Lawson 2009; Kegley and 
Wittkopf 1982).  Thereafter, Poe found that human rights abuses had a 
statistically significant effect on aid allocations in the anticipated direction but 
that this expression of American exceptionalism was tempered by the influence 
of the realist-oriented strategic and population size variables.  Both variables 
were in the anticipated positive direction for Carter and Reagan, while recipient 
need influenced allocations only under Reagan.  
Abrams and Lewis (1993) added further evidence of a relationship 
between human rights and foreign aid, making a rare approach on the subject 
from the field of economics.  They conducted a maximum-likelihood tobit 
analysis of US economic aid allocations to 117 countries in 1989 using in my
opinion a problematic expert opinion measure of human rights compiled by 
Charles Humana (1986) as their independent variable.  Despite what I view as 
the inherent limitations of their human rights measure, they found that respect 
for human rights played a positive and statistically significant role in 
determining levels of assistance, as did recipient need and a dummy variable for 
Central America.13  Racial and religious biases, measured as the percentage of 
Anglos and Christians in a country, respectively, did not influence aid allocation 
decisions.  While previous studies had been more circumspect about the 
implications of their findings, Abram and Lewis (1993) broke with this 
                                                
13 Humana’s Human Freedoms Index (HFI) suffered from a number of problems, all of which 
tend to call into question any causal inferences based on its use.  For example, the index relied 
on Western academics’ estimation of human rights conditi ns in the countries they studied rather 
than ground-truth, standards-based evidence.  Additionally, the questions were not derived from 
the UN International Bill of Human Rights.  Rather, they tended to overemphasize one aspect of 
human rights—freedom of association.  For a more detailed critique of the HFI, including these 
and other problems, see Barsh’s (1983) “Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology 




tendency.  They forcefully argued that their findings showed Congress’ insertion 
of Section 502B into the Foreign Assistance Act had its intended effct of 
bringing American exceptionalism to the fore of the allocation process.  
However, in my opinion, the persuasiveness of their argument was further 
undercut by their use of per capita foreign aid as the dependent variable.  From 
a conceptual standpoint, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found during their 
1982 interviews that US foreign aid decisionmakers did not conceptualize aid in 
per capita terms.  Rather, they discussed aid in terms of gross dollar amounts 
allocated annually.  Additionally, Uslaner (1976) had previously shown that the 
use of a per capita dependent variable is methodologically questionable, sinc  
the per capita transformation can lead to erroneously high or low correlations 
and induce unwarranted statistical relationships between variables.14      
Poe and Sirirangsi in 1994 expanded the inquiry into human rights and 
US foreign aid to 133 countries for the years 1983 to 1988, analyzing eco omic 
aid allocations for each year separately. Combining State Department and 
Amnesty International measures of human rights abuses into a single 5-point 
index, as Poe (1992) had two years prior, but this time incorporating Freedom 
House’s scales of political and civil rights too, the authors found that human 
rights abuses worsened the prospects for aid allocation in the probit gatekeeping 
model for some years but did not lower the amount of aid allocated in the OLS 
regression models at the second stage.  Moreover, while the human rights 
                                                
14 Uslaner instead maintains that the “solution to prblems of standardization is better met either 
by the use of direct linear transformations on the original variables, where possible, or by 
examining order-preserving transformations (such as beta weights) on the estimated 




coefficient at the second stage was in the expected (negative) direction, it 
repeatedly failed to achieve statistical significant.  The authors further found that 
gatekeeping decisions were consistently dominated by considerations of 
recipient need (measured by GNI per capita).  Whereas need increased, 
ideological disagreement with the United States (a dummy variable for leftist 
countries) decreased, the likelihood of economic aid allocation.  These sam  
considerations also dominated amount decisions, alongside the intended 
recipient country’s population size (logged) and proximity to the United States 
(a dummy variable for Central America).  The authors concluded on an 
uncharacteristically realist-oriented note, saying: 
while the US government can make the claim that human rights are 
considered in the decision-making process, it is not an argument that is 
likely to be very convincing given the outcomes of the aid allocation 
process, where human rights abusing countries, because of their 
political and strategic attributes, are at times allocated substantially 
more economic aid than others (507). 
 
On balance, then, the analysis called into question Poe’s (1992) previous finding
that human rights considerations influence aid amounts, as he admitted, by 
suggesting that they might have been sample bound.  
In an exploration of whether human rights considerations influenced 
decisions at the second stage of the allocation process on the amount of aid, 
which only one study up to that time had shown (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
1985), Poe teamed with Pilatovsky, Ogundele, and Miller in 1994 to conduct 
one of the first PCTS analyses of economic and military aid.  Their data 
consisted of aid allocations to 24 Latin American countries for the years 1983 to 




had been particularly high for countries in the region since the articul tion of the 
Monroe Doctrine.  As such, the authors envisioned the study as a more critical
test of the influence of human rights on foreign aid than previous studie.  Their 
goal was to determine whether humanitarian-related considerations ssociated 
with American exceptionalism, such as human rights and recipient ned, had 
influenced allocations to a region where realist-oriented concerns were 
presumably so entrenched.  They argued that the test was doubly difficult 
because the years examined covered those for the Reagan presidency and the 
first few years of George H.W. Bush’s, who had followed in Reagan’s foreign 
policy footsteps in attempting to roll back communism in the region (Apodaca 
2003).  The authors employed the same 5-point ordinal scale measure of h man 
rights as Poe (1992) and included control variables for country size, Central 
America, and the presence of 500 or more US military personnel in-cou try.  In 
an effort to sidestep the potentially confounding methodological issues of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, seminal problems for OLS regression 
models using PCTS data, the authors adopted Stimson’s (1985) recommendation 
to use generalized least squares-autoregressive moving average (GLS-ARMA) 
with dummy variables as an estimation technique.  After estimating the initial 
aid model, and following Stimson (1985), the authors rather than excluding 
cases introduced dummy variables for the outliers of El Salvador, Jamaic , Peru, 
Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and the 1989 Panamanian intervention.  
Thereafter, the findings were generally consistent with Cingranelli and 




economic aid allocations.  But other findings led the authors to offer a truce with 
their realist-oriented interlocutors.  The authors admitted that: 
more self-serving strategic concerns such as location in Central 
America, population, and ideological disagreement [by leftist 
governments], are also extremely important.  Further, some of the 
country dummy variables (e.g., the Panamanian intervention, El 
Salvador) are clearly tapping strategic considerations not accounted for 
adequately by other variables entered in the model.  These findings 
indicate that while human rights abuse is somewhat important in 
determining economic aid allocation levels in the general case, strategic 
considerations are the overriding concern (553).               
 
In the military aid model, which used an identical specification as its economic 
counterpart, the authors identified El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia as 
outliers and dummy variable candidates.  Thereafter, the results of their analysis 
indicated that human rights abusers were penalized, albeit mildly, with lesser 
military aid.  Recipient need and US military presence in-country also had their 
expected positive effect on military aid allocations, though in the case of the 
latter that effect was small and barely achieved statistical significance.  
American exceptionalism thus was found to influence the aid allocation process, 
even in what the authors envisioned as a realist realm, though once again 
strategic variables predominated.   
Meernik and Poe in 1995 offered the first genuinely global analysis of 
military aid allocations, focusing on the decade of the 1980s.  Departing f om 
the traditional analysis of aid allocations by presidential administration, the 
authors sought to test the so-called “Cold War consensus” of the 1980s, in which 
Democrats and Republicans supposedly agreed to increased cooperation to 




with the relatively poor explanatory power of two-stage multivariate models to 
date, which hovered around 20-35 percent of the variance, Meernik and Poe 
opted for a Heckman (1979) selection or “censored” probit model.  While most 
past studies had accepted the conceptual utility of modeling aid in two stages, 
they had failed to forge a methodological link between the two.  In forging this 
link, the authors effectively dealt with the selection bias that arises in the second 
stage of the aid allocation process (which I discuss in greater de ail in the next 
chapter).  The goodness of fit for the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage 
was 53 percent and 80 percent, respectively, a substantial improvement over 
previous studies’ approximately 30 percent that seemingly bore out the ility of 
the Heckman (1979) method.  The findings suggested that US decisionmakers 
tended to take human rights abuses into account at the gatekeeping stage, 
consistent with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) finding, but not thereaft .  
At the second stage, however, year-to-year change in human rights practices was 
statistically significant and indicated that a one-point improvement on he 5-
point human rights scale garnered a recipient country an additional $20 million 
in military aid.  Recipient need (GNP per capita) and having a communist 
neighbor also made a country more likely to pass the gatekeeping stage, while a 
leftist country had an increased chance of being “screened out” for US military 
assistance (Meernik and Poe 1995: 406).  Having a communist neighbor 
increased levels of assistance as well.  The same could be said for trade with the 
US, which gave limited support to the pluralist-business approach to aid 




membership was not important at the gatekeeping stage but the opposite at the 
level of assistance stage.  The authors explained this finding by noting that 
almost all NATO members were able to meet their defense requirements but, for 
those that could not, their importance to furthering the goals of the security pact 
meant they tend to acquire enormous amounts of aid.  The authors concluded by 
noting that human rights considerations were balanced against self-serving, 
realist-oriented interests during the allocation process but had been a p rsistent 
feature of aid decisionmaking during the Cold War.  The authors ended by 
arguing that future researchers needed to “pry open the ‘black box’ of [US] 
domestic and governmental characteristics as well as the international 
environmental factors that influence foreign aid decisions as a starting-point to 
explain and predict future trends” (409). 
Lebovic (1998) sought not to open the black box of aid allocations but 
foreign aid itself.15  He convincingly demonstrated that aid is a multidimensional 
category, “a whole that encompasses distinct forms of assistance that can be 
directed at distinct objectives” (118).  In making this argument, he reminded 
readers to bear in mind that not all military aid is security-related and not all 
economic aid is developmental.  His analysis focused on the level of assistance 
flowing from four economic and military aid component programs and allocated 
                                                
15 Lebovic’s study has been excluded from previous literature reviews on the topic precisely 
because he questions the utility of the traditional groupings of aid into an economic and military 
category (Poe and Sirirangsi, 1994).  While I do not follow his lead in this study by breaking up 
and mixing these categories, I accept the possible utility of doing so and offer a real-world 
policy-oriented reason for why researchers may want to follow Lebovic (1998) in my 




to 112 countries in 1980 and 1984.16   His aim was to determine whether 
McKinlay and Little’s (1977) realist-oriented “donor interests” or the 
exceptionalism-oriented “human need” they dismissed best explained aid 
allocations (80).  In a methodologically innovative step, Lebovic (1998) logged 
the dependent variable to ameliorate the influence of the well-known outliers 
that had plagued previous studies.  He was thus able to include Egypt, Israel, El 
Salvador, and other such outliers in the analysis.  Lebovic used three sets of 
independent variables—proxies for each of the three theoretical orientations 
typically employed to analyze aid allocations—in a factor analysis and 
multivariate models:  UN roll call votes in agreement with the United States and 
an index of “military inducements” (military expenditures as a percentage of 
GNP and standardized distance from the United States and Soviet Union) to 
measure US political-military interests; exports to the United States and total US 
direct private investments to measure pluralist-business related US economic 
interest; and GNP per capita and human rights as indicators of American 
exceptionalism.  The factor analysis revealed a significant difference in each 
administration’s handling of these programs, particularly the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF), which was specifically established by the Foreign Assistance Act to 
assist countries in which the United States had a security stake but that did not 
qualify for development assistance.  Whereas Carter tended to use the ESF, 
contrary to Congressional intent, as a supplement to address human need, 
                                                
16 The four types of economic assistance were loans and grants from the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), Food for Peac , Peace Corps, and Export-Import 
programs.  The four types of military assistance included aid from the Military Assistance, 
Foreign Military Sales, Economic Support Fund, and I ternational Military Education and 




Reagan tended use the ESF and all other programs in a “single-dimensional” 
policy aimed at securing US political-military interests (121).  Though Lebovic 
did not draw the conclusion, I view this finding as substantiating criticism of 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) intuitive selection of aid programs they 
regarded as solidly economic in nature (one of which was the ESF).  Lebovic 
(1998) then constructed OLS models based on the grouping of programs 
obtained from the factor analysis—two groups of four programs for each 
administration—and all programs together. Taken together, the OLS models 
tended to suggest that political-military considerations best explained allocations 
by Carter and Reagan.  Human rights were shown to generally dampen the 
amount of aid allocated by both administrations, with the human rights variable 
reaching statistical significance in the model analyzing all aid programs together 
and the more human needs groupings under each president.17  Recipient need 
also tended to play a role, as did economic interests under Reagan. Lebovic 
concluded by observing that aid programs are not necessarily fungible, as 
Morgenthau (1961) and likeminded realist argue, but that McKinlay and Little’s 
(1977) early contention that self-serving donor interests dominate aid allocations 
nevertheless appears consistent with his findings.  He added that the observable 
changes in program use between Carter and Reagan were largely  matter of 
emphasis, though, since the persistence of political-military considerations 
across each administration argues for continuity in the aid decisionmaking 
process.   
                                                
17 For Carter, this grouping consisted of USAID and the Food for Peace program.  It was the 




Returning to the analysis of aggregate foreign aid, rather than its 
constituent programs, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) tested the explanatory 
power of the three IR approaches (though renaming them) on aid allocations for 
127 countries during and after the Cold War era.  Whereas the “systemic 
approach” had hallmarks of realism, including locating the primary determinant 
of US aid decisionmaking in the nature of the international self-help system, and 
was measured by US military presence (100 or more troops) and dummy 
variables for formal alliance with the United States, the “societal [pluralist] 
approach” proceeded from the understanding that foreign aid is a reflection of 
the preferences of MNCs as measured by level of imports to the US and 
adherence to free market principles (level of trade/GNP).  The “statist,” or 
American exceptionalism, approach emphasized human needs in the guise of an 
Amnesty International-US State Department combined human rights and GNP 
per capita variable.  This last approach also included the more ideological 
interest of promoting democracy abroad, based on Gurr’s Polity III regime type 
score.   Total bilateral aid (economic + military aid) served as the dependent 
variable despite the potential pitfalls of combining categories of aid long—and 
in my opinion rightly—regarded as conceptually distinct.  The authors used a 
Heckman (1979) selection model, consisting of probit and OLS with panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE), to estimate the gatekeeping and level of 
assistance stage of the allocation process, respectively.  As for the results, both 
during and after the Cold War, the human rights variable was statistic lly 




However, the sign on the variable was in the opposite direction at the level of 
assistance stage.  This rather paradoxical finding suggested to the authors that if 
a country adhered to basic human rights criteria to pass the gatekeeping stage it 
was not be penalized with reduced aid amounts for subsequent human rights 
abuses.  US military presence was positively related to aid allocations at each 
stage of the process before and after the Cold War, and the same could be said 
of democracies and needy countries.  As expected, those countries with a 
communist neighbor were more likely to receive aid, and more of it, durng the 
Cold War but not thereafter.  Taken together, the results tended to suggest that 
there are significant differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War and 
that the two are rightly regarded as distinct eras when it comes to aid allocations.  
The post-Cold War dummy variable further drove home this point.  Countries 
tended to receive $29 million less in total aid after the Cold War, suggesting that 
as the communist threat diminished something analogous to a “peace divid n ” 
emerged.  The authors conclude by noting that their analysis suggested tha  the 
security-driven goals inherent to the systemic [realist] approach had become less 
important in the post-Cold War era as the statist [American exceptionalism] 
approach rose in prominence.  They cautioned, however, against assuming that 
the promotion of human rights and democracy would continue to ascend in 
importance if the international environment changed or a major threat to the 
United States reappeared.        
Returning to the more traditional analysis of administration-specific 




economic and military aid allocation decisions to 140 countries for the years 
1976 to 1995.  Their goal was to highlight differences in allocations under the 
second Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administration, in addition to the first few 
years of Clinton administration.  US economic and military aid per capita served 
as the dependent variables notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological 
limitations noted by Uslaner (1976).  The authors used the Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) as the independent variable, which effectively systematizes he 5-point 
State Department-Amnesty International scale employed in previous studies.  
Their models also included a previously-untested control variable, past aid 
allocations, which the authors argued was theoretically justified because Guess 
(1987) had found that some foreign aid appropriations had been included in 
continuing resolutions (CR) as a result of bureaucratic inertia and disagreement 
over annual appropriations bills.  Interestingly, and unlike in previous studie , 
presidential administrations were coded as dummy variables using the Carter 
administration as a reference category instead of modeled separately.  They used 
logit to estimate the gatekeeping model and a least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) covariance procedure to estimate the level of assistance models.   At the 
gatekeeping stage for economic aid, the authors found that only the Clinton 
administration failed to use human rights as criteria for deciding whether a 
country would receive aid. Past aid and recipient need proved significant or 
each administration, as did economic interest (US exports) for Clinton and the 
Latin American region for Carter, the first Reagan, and the G.H.W. Bush 




statistical significance at the .01 level and was in the anticipa ed negative 
direction.  Past aid again proved influential, as did recipient need.  P rhaps most 
interestingly, the dummy variables representing presidential administrations 
failed to achieve statistical significance, indicating that alloc tions under 
Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton were not much different than those under 
Carter (the categorical referent). This suggested that the allocation process is 
marked by continuity of interest, a conclusion Lebovic (1998) previously 
offered.   For military aid at the gatekeeping stage, the Carter, Reagan (both 
terms), and G.H.W. administration were found to have relied on human rights 
considerations in making gatekeeping decisions.  Past aid and recipient ne d 
also were influential for all but Clinton.  At the level of assistance stage, the 
human rights variable was in the anticipated direction but failed to achieve 
statistical significance.  Only the variables past aid, US military presence, and 
Latin America achieved significance.  The second Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and 
Clinton administration dummy variables also achieve statistical s gnificance and 
tended to reduce military aid relative to Carter.  Taken together, t se findings 
suggest that political and security considerations often overruled Carter’s good 
intentions and rhetorical commitment to the promotion of human rights.  
However, based on the finding that human rights had influenced most aid 
gatekeeping decisions, including Reagan’s, despite his public declaration that 
human rights were not the proper aim of US foreign policy, the authors agreed 
with Donnelly (1995) assertion that over this period “human rights actually 




and Stohl (1999) nevertheless went on to say that “overall budget cuts, not 
concerns for human rights, were the most important inputs in the reduction of 
individual nation’s military aid allocations” (195).   
 
…And New Voices Join In 
In more recent years, new voices have joined the debate over US foreign 
aid and human rights initiated by Poe, Stohl, Apodaca, Meernik, and Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello, among others.18  Lai (2003) was one of the first.  His goal in so 
doing was to test Meernik, Krueger, and Poe’s (1998) claim that the influ nce of 
human rights considerations was increasing and security interests decreasing in 
the post-Cold War era.  Lai (2003) argued that the authors had failed to 
anticipate the emerging threat posed by “rogue states” in the post-Cold War era.  
In attempting to reassert realist explanations of aid allocations, Lai compared the 
determinants of US foreign aid decisionmaking in the Cold War (1982-90) and 
post-Cold War (1991-96) eras using a Heckman (1979) selection model.  
Following Lebovic’s (1998) example, Lai (2003) took the natural log of his 
dependent variable—total (economic + military) foreign aid—to facilit te the 
inclusion of statistical outliers.  In an interesting coding technique, which in my 
                                                
18 Though I regard Douglas Gibler as one of the most thought provoking of these new voices, I 
do not review his 2008 Journal of Politics article, entitled “United States Economic Aid and 
Repression: The Opportunity Cost Argument,” in this study.  In that article, Gibler attempts to 
show that human rights records influence US foreign aid allocations indirectly.  He argues that in 
monitoring human rights abuses the US Government effectively raises the costs of repression.  
In light of this monitoring, regimes that hope to receive US foreign aid must weigh the utility of 
abuses against a possible loss of millions of dollars of US assistance.  While this is an interesting 
argument, the indirect effect Gibler investigates is not what Congress had in mind in drafting 
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act.  Congress drew a direct link between human rights 
abuses and US foreign aid, stating that no “assistance may be provided to any country the 
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 




estimation mitigated much of the conceptual confusion associated wih Poe’s 
(1991) overly-inclusive strategic index variable, Lai (2003) created a vari ble to 
tap the evolving nature of security threats—and only threats—to the Unit d 
States.  To do so, he examined State Department and executive branch 
documents to identify rogue states.  Lai then combined this information with 
older, established measures of US security concerns.  The dummy variable he 
created coded countries with a communist neighbor during the Cold War, Latin 
American countries long considered by US decisionmakers as within the United 
States’ sphere of influence, and countries bordering a rogue state during the 
post-Cold War era as “1” and all others “0”.  In contrast to past studies (Poe et 
al. 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998), Lai (2003) 
found that human rights—as measured by combining Freedom House political 
and civil rights measures into a 7-point ordinal scale—did not influence the 
initial yes/no gatekeeping decision to allocate aid in either t  Cold War or post-
Cold War era.  Nor did the Freedom House measure influence second-stage 
decisions concerning levels of aid, though a secondary dummy variable tapping 
human rights achieve moderate-to-high statistical significance (.05-.01 level) for 
various models and suggested that abusive countries are likely to receive less aid 
than others.19  Interestingly, his finding for Gurr’s Polity 98 democracy variable 
also was contrary to previous findings, perhaps owing to the inclusion of 
                                                
19 Lai (2003) coded the dummy variable “1” if a country scored a 6-7 on the Freedom House 
scale, which he reasoned are the two categories resrved for the most egregious human rights 
abusers and “0” for all others.  This decision was b ed on the belief that a lack of variation in 
the more commonly used 5-point PTS may lead to confounding results.  Lai reasoned that “since 
a small number of the cases [for the PTS] are in the worst two human rights offender groups 
(Groups 4 and 5), statistical significance to this variable may be due to US aid to states in the 
middle group (Group 3) and not because the USA is aiding states in the worst two groups” 




Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
which scholars have routinely excluded from previous studies by arguing that 
US foreign aid decisionmakers rarely considered OECD countries for aid during 
the years under examination (Apodaca and Stohl 1999).  In any event, US 
decisionmakers allocated democracies less aid than non-democracies ac ording 
to Lai (2003).  Curiously, security concerns also appeared to be as important, if 
not more so, to aid decisionmaking in the post-Cold War as in the Cold War era.  
Lai’s composite threat variable also achieved statistical significant at the 
gatekeeping stage, but not thereafter, suggesting threat perception of US 
decisionmakers mattered in deciding which countries they allocated aid but not 
in which countries were allocated more.  He also found that past aid, lagged by 
one year, and population (logged) were statistically significant and positively 
related to levels of assistance, as was the Correlates of War (COW) alliance 
variable.  Looking across his findings, Lai opted to conclude on a 
methodological note.  He asserted that methodological pitfalls, particul ly 
autocorrelation, had confounded the findings of previous studies on the 
relationship between human rights and US foreign aid.  He opined in closi g 
that realism continues to be the best explanation of allocation decisionmaking.        
Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) sought to extend the general study 
of US foreign aid, including its relationship to human rights, with an 
investigation into the role political considerations have played in disaster-related 
foreign aid allocations before and after the Cold War. Their aim was to 




allocate such aid apolitically and solely on the basis of human need.  Taking a 
cue from Lebovic (1998), the authors focused exclusively on aid flowing from 
one component of the US foreign aid program—the US disaster assistance relief 
fund—for the years 1964 to 1995.  They operationalized four variables—the 
COW alliance measure; a Cold War dummy variable (1964-89); regime type 
(Polity IV); and need/level of development (GDP per capita)—to account for 
considerations previously demonstrated to influence US foreign aid 
decisionmaking.  In a welcome departure from previous studies, which often 
mention but rarely incorporate US domestic considerations into their models, the 
authors heeded Meernik and Poe’s (1995) admonishment and opened the “black 
box” of US domestic politics.  Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) 
incorporated three domestically-focused variables—the US budget deficit (as 
percentage of the total government budget), US disasters (property damage 
estimates and deaths), and media attention to a foreign disaster (number of 
references in the New York Times index)—into the analysis.  Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) data in millions of constant 1994 US dollars served 
as their dependent variable.  The authors employed Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptual model along with the Heckman 
(1979) selection method to estimate allocation decisions.   At the gatekeeping 
stage, they found that alliance ties strongly influence aid decisionmaking before 
and after the Cold War.  The Cold War variable also was statistic lly significant, 
though, suggesting the United States allocated disaster-related aid for political 




more likely than their wealthier counterparts to receive disaster aid, while 
democracies and non-democracies were almost equally likely to receive such 
assistance.  The US domestic variables also achieved statistical significance.  
Larger domestic deficits constrained disaster assistance, but only modestly, 
suggesting the OFDA and Congress somewhat factored in a potential negative 
reaction from taxpayers to high allocation outputs.  Cooper, Olson, and V  
Belle (2005) also found the impact of New York Times coverage was significant, 
but only marginal, with an increase in ten stories covering a disaster increasing 
the probability of receiving aid from 47 to 50 percent.  US disasters had only 
marginal effects, as well.  At the level of assistance stage, and in contrast to 
results of the gatekeeping analysis, the US foreign policy and deficit variables 
proved statistically insignificant.  This suggested to the authors tat OFDA must 
“defend which disasters it recognizes as worthy, not the level of response to 
each” (469).  In short, the findings provide at least some support for the 
hypothesis that the allocation of disaster aid is not an objective, apolitical 
process and that it is influenced by political considerations at home and abroad.  
Their findings also reinforced the utility of time-tested explanatory variables of 
US foreign aid allocations—irrespective of how the dependent foreign aid 
variable is parsed out (see Lebovic 1998)—and highlighted the importance of 
testing for US domestic effects on decisionmaking.     
Finally, Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) returned to a more direct 
analysis of the human rights-US foreign aid linkage.  They analyzed data on 151 




human rights varied by countries’ level of democracy or economic developm nt 
and, as a secondary matter, whether respect for human rights had become more 
or less influential in the allocation process since Cold War’s end.  The authors 
chose to focus solely on economic aid (constant US 2004 dollars), which they 
logged at the level of assistance stage so that outliers could be included in the 
study.  The PTS served as the human rights variable, the natural log of GPD per 
capita for recipient need, level of trade with the US as a measur  pluralist-
business interests, with population (2002 figures logged) and alliance (COW 
measure) tapping US strategic considerations.  Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers’ 
(1995) Polity IV democracy measured level of democracy.  Values for this 
variable, which range from -10 to 10, were transformed by the authors so that 
the most democratic countries had the highest values, autocracies the lowest, 
and “transitional” countries scored -6 to 6.  Using a Heckman (1979) selection 
method, the authors found that recipient need was the most important 
determinant and human rights of no significance at the gatekeeping stage during 
the Cold War.  However, in the post-Cold War an interesting finding emerged 
for the human rights variable. The variable demonstrates a significant but 
negative effect on allocations, suggesting that greater respect for human rights 
decreased the likelihood of decisionmakers allocating aid.  The authors further 
found that human rights were among several variables that influenced the level 
of economic assistance allocated in the post-Cold War era, including regime 
type and recipient need, but their influence was again unexpectedly negative.  




US foreign aid (Schultz 1981a and 1981b; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984) 
and that of Carleton and Stohl (1987), the latter of which suggested US 
decisionmakers do not incorporate human rights considerations into the aid 
allocation process.  The authors went on to find that US decisionmakers have a 
tendency to hold autocratic countries with poor human rights practices to a 
higher standard of human rights practices than autocracies with rela ively good 
practices, suggesting change in human rights practices over time matt rs in the 
post-Cold War period and, more generally, that a systemic double standard may 
be present in the allocation process.  However, US decisionmakers typically 
allocated countries with low economic development and better human rights 
practices less aid than those with poor practices.  The authors in closi g surmise 
their findings “generally…support the refrain of critics that US aid behavior is 
not consistent with human rights rhetoric” (196).  In so doing, they harkened 
back to Poe and Sirirangsi (1994) concluding remarks and make the most recent 
contribution to this ongoing debate. 
 
Discussion and Hypotheses 
With the contours of this ongoing debate fresh in mind, I turn in this 
section to explicating hypotheses that not only speak to the research questions 
outlined in the first chapter but also build upon, compliment, and extend the past 
findings on human rights and US foreign aid decisionmaking highlighted in the 
literature review.  To achieve this goal, I synthesize the conceptual and 




incorporate them into the hypotheses.  One such theme is the near unive sal 
acceptance of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptual model 
of the aid allocation process.  Persuaded that theirs remains the most 
theoretically defensible conceptualization and motivated by a desire to ensure 
my findings fit neatly into the existing literature, I follow their xample. Thus, I 
explicate each hypothesis as effectively two-in-one; that is, I word the 
hypotheses such that they simultaneously relate to the (a) gatekeeping and (b) 
level of assistance stage of the US foreign aid decisionmaking process.   
I group the hypotheses by, and word them consistent with the 
expectations of, the three arguments about US foreign aid decisionmaking 
during the war on terror that spurred this study.  The arguments hinge on claims 
that decisionmakers in the post-9/11 environment jettisoned human rights
considerations during the allocation process, except for when these 
considerations served as a readymade excuse to penalize countries that failed to 
partner with the United States in the war on terror by denying them aid.   Save 
for this exception, then, critics argue human rights considerations failed to 
influence US foreign aid allocations—let alone in the manner Section 502B of 
the Foreign Assistance Act requires—during the war on terror.  Thus, the 
hypotheses run counter to my expectations of American exceptionalism nd a 
positive relationship between human rights and foreign aid in all but one 
instance.  Hypotheses 1-3 relate to the argument about the relationship, or lack 
thereof, between human rights and US foreign aid allocations under the G.W. 




era, the war on terror, which critics argues has been indifferent to the promotion 
of human rights, and contrast them with allocations made during the war on 
terror with previous eras.  Hypotheses 6-7 examine the human rights-foreign aid 
linkage for partners and non-partners in the war on terror, where critics argue 
only for a linkage in so far US decisionmakers applied the human rights 
provision’s requirements to non-partners but not partners when allocating 
foreign aid.      
 
 
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations under the George W. Bush 
Administration 
As mentioned, the first set of hypotheses evaluates the relationship 
between human rights and foreign aid allocations under the G.W. Bush 
administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, previous 
administrations also bound by the human rights provision.  This approach is 
designed to determine whether human rights promotion was a casualty of 9/11, 
as critics claim, because the G.W. Bush administration redirected US foreign 
policy away from “soft” power concerns like human rights and toward meeting 
the threat posed by international terrorism (Nye 2009).  Critics also content this 
casualty was a historical first, with some adding that it abruptly ended the 
positive influence human rights considerations had been exerting on US foreign 
policy.     
Studies on previous administrations highlighted in the literature review 




the whole, they argue for continuity in decisionmaking from administration-to-
administration, particularly when it comes to the influence of strategic security 
concerns (Lebovic 1998; Lai, 2003; Meernik and Poe 1995; Carleton and Stohl 
1987; Poe 1991 and 1992).  However, the results are somewhat more mixed on 
the influence of human rights.  Some studies have shown human rights 
considerations have at times enjoyed a modest but positive influence on US 
foreign aid allocations, primarily at the gatekeeping stage of process.  Such has 
been the case in a study on the Reagan administration, the G.H.W. Bush, and, on 
occasion, the Carter administration (Poe 1991 and 1992; Apodaca and Stohl 
1999; Poe et al. 1994; Stohl and Carleton 1985).  Still others, including more 
recent studies, have reached the opposite conclusion (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg 
and Moskowitz 2009).  To my knowledge, findings for the G.W. Bush 
administration have yet to be added to this literature.  The hypotheses explicated 
below promise to elicit those findings.   In so doing, they promise to fit neatly 
into the empirical literature, most of which focuses on aid allocati n by 
presidential administration (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Carleton and 
Stohl 1985; Poe 1991; Lebovic 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999).  Again, 
consistent with critics’ arguments, my initial set of hypotheses is as follows:   
 
Hypotheses 1a-b: After 9/11, human rights considerations had no 
significant effect on the G.W. Bush administration’s decisions 
regarding (a) which countries would receive aid and (b) the amount 





Hypotheses 2a-b: The failure of human rights concerns to influence 
foreign aid allocations consistent with the human rights provision (and 
my own expectations) under the G.W. Bush administration at the (a) 
gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage was a historical first.   
 
Hypotheses 3a-b:  In contrast to the G.W. Bush administration, as the 
human rights record of a country improved, the (a) probability of that 
country receiving aid and (b) the amount it could expect to receive 
under previous administrations improved.  
 
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations during the Era of the War
on Terror 
In contrast to the first set of hypotheses, which treats the war on terror as 
a finite policy pursuit of the G.W. Bush administration, the second set treats the 
war on terror as an era in US foreign policy in which human rights concerns 
have ceased to influence US foreign aid allocations. 20   I thus assume for the 
purposes of hypotheses 4-5 that the war on terror represents a “paradigm shift” 
in US foreign aid decisionmaking, as some critics of the war contend, one that 
has fundamentally altered allocation outcomes in ways that are antithetical to the 
promotion of human rights.21  One can expect this paradigm to endure, so their 
argument goes, so long as combating terrorism remains the United States’ 
                                                
20 Thus, while the theoretical understanding and interpretation of findings differ for the first and 
second set of hypotheses, owing to the differing arguments about the war on terror from which 
they are derived, the years for the G.W. Bush administration and era of the war on terror are 
coterminous.  For a fuller discussion on this issue, e  the introductory section of Chapter 5.   
21 As I demonstrate and discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5, there is cause to believe this 




overriding foreign policy goal (Christie 2008: 13-15).  Consequently, any 
observable disruption in the human rights-US foreign aid linkage between th  
war on terror and previous eras I take on critics behalf as, at least in part, owing 
to this shift (Mertus 2008; Apodaca 2006).  Whether the current administration’s 
allocations are indicative of this shift is a matter of speculation that is beyond 
the scope of this study.  Here, I simply examine allocation decisions made 
during the war on terror using the data at hand (2001-2008).  In so doing, my 
hypotheses extend the findings of studies that have examined the human rights-
foreign aid linkage in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Meernik, Krueger, 
and Poe 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Meernik and Poe 
1995).  As indicated in the literature review, past studies suggest that linkage is 
bound up with the nature and scope of US strategic security threats.  Whereas 
that threat was communist expansion during the Cold War (Meernik, Krueger, 
and Poe 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik and Poe 1995), it morphs into 
rogue regimes in the post-Cold War era (Lai 2003).  Poe (1991) has called on 
researchers to improve scholarly understanding of the “evolution of the effects 
of human rights on aid allocations” over theoretically interesting time periods, 
particularly as threats to US security emerge and subside (211).  Meernik and 
Poe (1995) echo this call.  The aforementioned studies have answered this call 
for Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  With the following hypothesis, I attempt 





Hypotheses 4a-b: In contrast to the war on terror, during the post-Cold 
War era the greater the respect for human rights the greater the (a) 
prospects of a country receiving aid and (b) more of it. 
 
If the United States’ promotion of “human rights ended shortly after 
September 11, 2001,” as some critics argue, might that promotion extend back 
through the post-Cold War and into the Cold War era too (Mertus 2008: 1)?   
Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found that respect for human rights had 
become an increasingly influential determinant of US foreign aid allocations as 
the threat of communism faded and the post-Cold War era emerged.  But Poe 
(1991; 1992) and Poe et al. (1994) found that human rights considerations 
influenced aid decisionmaking even before the threat of communism faded.  
Together these findings provide some optimism for believing that the era of 
human rights that the war on terror supposedly ended may encompass the Cold 
War and post-Cold War periods.  To explore this possibility, I offer a hypothesis 
on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid that speaks to all three 
eras in decisionmaking:   
 
Hypotheses 5a-b: The war on terror ended a positive trend in the 
human rights-foreign aid linkage, one that subsumes the post-Cold War 






Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-
partners in the War on Terror 
 
The third and final set of hypotheses treat US aid allocations during the 
war on terror as a self-contained quantitative case study.  In a November 6, 2001 
speech, President G.W. Bush told countries that they could chose to be “either
with us or against us” in the war on terror.  The following hypotheses test 
whether the President’s ultimatum was a mere rhetorical catchphrase or a 
meaningful policy statement that created a double standard in the US foreign aid 
allocation process similar to what Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) found 
when focusing on disaster aid.  I have worded the hypotheses to elicit 
differences, if any, in the human rights-foreign aid linkage for partners and non-
partners in the war on terror. Countries that were “with us” are considered 
partners and “against us” non-partners in the war on terror.  If US foreign aid 
decisionmakers turned a blind eye to, or otherwise failed to create disincentives 
for, the human rights abuses of partners while penalizing those of non-partners 
as some contend, hypotheses 6-7 promise to illustrate this hypocris.  My final 
set of hypotheses is:    
 
Hypotheses 6a-b: Human rights considerations failed to influence the 
(a) prospects of a partner receiving aid and (c) the amount they could 
expect to receive. 
 
Hypotheses 7a-b: In contrast to partners in the war on terror, US 




practices such that those with poor human rights records were (a) less 
likely to be allocated aid and (b) could expect lesser amounts. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion of themes from the literature review that helped to inform 
my explication of the above hypotheses continues in Chapter 3.  Because my 
focus in the next chapter is the construction of multivariate models of US 
foreign aid decisionmaking, the discussion turns from conceptual and empirical 
themes to variable selection and methodology.  It is to these aspects of the 











In this chapter, I construct multivariate models of US foreign aid 
decisionmaking to test the hypotheses explicated in Chapter 2.  Informed by the 
literature review, I operationalize in the first section the dependent variables, 
independent variables, and control variables.  In the second section, I highlight 
methodological issues, including the potentially confounding methodological 
problems that may arise for models employing PCTS data and my proposed 
correctives. The final section discusses preliminary model robustness check  and 
data preparation, including my identification and coding of presidential 





Selecting the dependent variable, or variables, is a contentious issue in 
the study of human rights and US foreign aid.  While some opt to use total 
(economic + military) foreign aid (Meernik, Poe, and Krueger 1998; Lai 2003), 
arguing it lends insight into the broad contours of the US foreign aid program, 




(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994).  Still others, such 
as Lebovic (1998) and later Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005), remind 
readers that US foreign aid is a multidimensional whole comprised of various 
aid components that may be disaggregated into distinct funds.  While Lebovic’s 
(1998) admonishment is well-advised, and serves as the basis for one of my 
suggestions for future research, disaggregating aid into its various funding 
components makes little sense for the purposes of this study.  The arguments 
that spurred this inquiry recognize, either explicitly or implicitly, the traditional 
categorical distinction between economic and military aid while making few 
specific claims about particular funding components or, for that matter, total 
foreign aid.  Moreover, examination of Foreign Operations budget requests and 
related appropriation reports suggest both the White House and Congress 
observe this traditional distinction (Library of Congress 2010).  Based on these 
considerations, and in an effort to ensure my findings fit neatly into the existing 
literature, I test my hypotheses against the two most often used dependent 
variables in this subfield of foreign policy studies: US bilateral economic and 
military aid.   
  For each dependent variable, I obtained aid figures from the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID)’s US Overseas Loans and Grants, 
Obligations, and Loan Authorizations, commonly known as the “Greenbook.”  
The Greenbook provides a complete and official record of allocations—as 
opposed to actual disbursements—authorized by US foreign aid decisionmakers 




(1985) two-stage decisionmaking model upon which my hypotheses are based, I 
operationalized the dependent variables twice.  The first operationalization is a 
dummy variable representing the initial yes/no decision of whether a country 
will pass the gatekeeping stage.  Thus, I have coded the dependent variables at 
this stage as “1” for countries allocated aid and “0” for those allocated nothing 
in a given year.  As with most previous studies, the dependent variables at the 
second stage—where levels of assistance are determined—are continuous aid 
dollars.  Consistent with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) interv ew data, I 
recorded these figures in gross US dollars (millions of constant 2008 dollars) 
rather than per capita dollars to avoid the potential methodological difficulties 
highlighted in the literature review that the per capita transformation may 
create.22  To compensate for extremes in the gross amounts of US foreign aid 
allocated within and between countries, I followed the lead of past studies 
(Lebovic 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009) in adopting 
Uslaner’s (1976) suggestion of taking the natural log of the dependent variable.  
While this transformation complicates the interpretation of the magnitude of the 
coefficient for continuous explanatory variables, it can be overcome throug  
statistical means and does not influence the direction or statistic l ignificance 
of affected variables.  Moreover, the transformation allows me to incorporate 
into the analysis such “non-routine” cases as El Salvador, Egypt, and Israel, and 
more importantly for an analysis of aid allocations during the war on terror, 
Afghanistan and Iraq.   
                                                
22 In the interest of thoroughness, I also tested annual change in economic and military aid as 
dependent variables.  The models proved unsatisfactory, with the explanatory variables generally 






My primary criterion in operationalizing human rights is to remain 
faithful to the conceptualization espoused by the arguments that spurred this 
study.  The arguments beg for a measure that approximates the human rights 
“reality” in which US foreign aid decisionmakers during the war on terror 
operated—one in which the human rights abuses of would-be aid recipients 
were widely known but, at least according to the war’s critics, ignored to 
varying degrees.  With this in mind, my options are to operationalize that reality 
based solely on US State Department Country Reports, which US 
decisionmakers are required by the Foreign Assistance Act to onsider when 
allocating aid, or to combine the Reports with other readily available sources of 
information.  The CRS 2005 Report for Congress entitled, “East Timor: 
Potential Issues for Congress,” identifies one such oft-used source as Amnesty 
International. Official transcripts of US decisionmakers debating human rights 
and foreign appropriations also cite Amnesty as a source (Congressional Record 
2011).        
With this “reality” in mind, and based on its respectability in the 
literature and fewer missing values, I operationalize the concept of human rights 
using the Political Terror Scale (PTS).  However, had I opted to employ only 
the State Department measure, my model results would have been virtually 




measures are highly correlated at 0.95.23  Developed by Stohl et al. (1984) and 
currently maintained by Gibney, Cornett, and Wood (2010), the PTS employs a 
5-point scale to measure the level of state-sanctioned political violence and 
terror a country’s citizens endure in a given year based on internationally-
recognized human rights norms.24  The scale is based on an average of scores 
derived from Amnesty International reports and Country Reports.25   As 
constructed, the scale ranges from countries that score a “1” for having a secure 
rule of law under which politically-motivated imprisonment, torture, and murder 
are extremely rare to those that score a “5” because terrorhas expanded to the 
entire population.26  For ease of interpretation, this study adopts the common 
                                                
23 Though the variables are virtual proxies for one aother, in the interest of thoroughness I 
substituted the State Department human rights measure into my models to test for the 
possibility that US decisionmakers discuss Amnesty In ernational reports but, ultimately, fall 
back on Country Reports when determining aid allocations and that model differences—
however unlikely—could arise. In any case, substituting the State Department measure of human 
rights for PTS with the same two year lag produced virtually identical results.  For example, in 
the G.W. Bush economic aid model presented in Chapter 4, whereas the PTS human rights 
coefficient at the level of assistance stage was -.762, the State Department coefficient was -.750.       
24 I considered other prominent measures of human rights, most notably Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, which also is a standards-based index of fifteen internationally-
recognized human rights measures for 195 countries.  Unfortunately, the CIRI data only covers 
the years 1981 to 2007 and the research design of this s udy and the arguments it seeks to 
address require an analysis of the entire period covered by the human rights provision.  Thus, 
measures going back to 1977 were a serious consideration in my selection of an independent 
variable.  I also considered Freedom House measures of civil and political rights.  However, 
based on their high correlations with the PTS—91.7 percent—the Freedom House measures 
almost certainly would produce similar results to th se presented hereafter.  I also considered 
combining the PTS and Freedom House measures.  However, given their high correlation and 
the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological difficulties posed by combining the PTS 5-point 
scale with the Freedom House 7-point scale, I did not pursue this option.  Finally, I also tested a 
conceptualization of human rights appearing in Cingra elli and Pasquarello’s (1985) and Poe’s 
(1991) study—change in human rights—by coding a “1” for any improvement and “-1” and 
worsening in human rights conditions from year to year.  The coefficient on the variable carried 
a positive sign in most models, but it failed to achieve statistical significance in bivariate 
analysis. 
25 For some country-years one of the two scores was mis ing.  In these cases, I used the available 
score rather than treating the case as missing.  Given its more complete coverage, the State 
Department score usually were the available score. 
26 The PTS is a 5-point ordinal scale originally develop d by Freedom House and first compiled 
by Gibney and Dalton (1996).  According to the original coding, which I have reversed, the scale 




practice of reversing the scale such that greater respect for human rights is 
recorded as the higher values.  Thus, if better human rights practices are 
associated with higher levels of aid, as American exceptionalism contends, the 
coefficient on the human rights variable should carry a positive sign in the 
models to come.  Consistent with previous studies (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994), I lagged the human 
rights variable two years.27  The two-year lag reflects the real-world, inevitable 
delay between the compilation and delivery of C untry Reports—again, the US 
Government’s official record of abuses—and vetted Amnesty International 
information to US foreign aid decisionmakers and their allocation decision.  In 
effect, it “approximates the information available to decisionmakers in the year 
immediately previous to the fiscal year under study, when foreign assistance 
decisions are typically made” (Poe 1992: 151).     
                                                                                                                                                 
societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
ideological goals. Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers 
of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its 
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.  Level 3: 
There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution 
or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a 
trial, for political views is accepted.  Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for 
nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are 
exceptional. Political murder is rare.  Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are 
not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare o  exceptional. Political murders are extremely 
rare.  For additional information see, “The Political Terror Scale: A Re-introduction and a 
Comparison to CIRI,” by Reed Wood and Dr. Mark Gibney in Human Rights Quarterly, 
Volume 32, Number 2, May 2010, pp. 367-400. 
27 I also tested lags of 0-3 years.  The two-year lag on averaged performed best and, as 
discussed, remains the most theoretically defensible.  Of the lags tested, the human rights 
variable elicited similar results as those reported—in terms of the sign of the coefficient—





To ensure any influence human rights considerations may have on US 
foreign aid allocations is not overestimated, and to further my goal of evaluating 
the explanatory power of the three most common theoretical approaches to the 
study of US foreign aid decisionmaking, I employ a number of control variables.  
My choice of control variables is based on theoretical considerations, their 
performance in previous studies highlighted in the literature review d, and my 
own preliminary analysis.  Taken together, they tap to varying degrees the 
constellation of considerations believed to have influenced the US foreign aid 
program since its inception under the Marshall Plan (Veillette 2008; Eberstadt 
1988).28  The first two control variables tap a humanitarian consideration other 
than human rights and an ideological consideration that, as mentioned in the
literature review, are regarded by some scholars—myself included—as 
additional indicators of American exceptionalism.  The next five tap realist-
oriented considerations previously shown or theorized to influence foreign aid 
allocations.  The final control variable taps interests related to the pluralist-
                                                
28 Responding to Meernik and Poe’s (1995), and following Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) 
example, this study also opened the “black box” of the state o xamine how oft-mentioned, but 
rarely tested domestic variables influence the aid allocation process.  Two such variables were 
tested in preliminary models: the US deficit and a dummy variable called “divided 
government” that identified those years in which different parties controlled the White House 
and Congress.  Both variables were conceptualized as potential domestic constraints on aid 
allocations, with the latter understood to also constrain a presidential administration’s ability to 
resort to “extraordinary circumstances” without risking political backlash from Congress.  
Interestingly, neither added much to the models.  The divided government variable was 
generally negative, indicating that the prospects of receiving aid and the amount received were 
lessened when divided government was present, but the variable regularly failed to achieve 
statistical significance.  The US deficit variable showed little relation to aid allocations.  This 
finding may be because foreign aid is not a big-ticket budget item—typically constituting one 
percent or less of the annual US budget—and is rarely in jeopardy of dramatic funding cuts since 




business explanation of US foreign aid.  My operationalizations of the control 
variables are as follows:  
 
A.  Humanitarian Interests (other than human rights) 
The results of previous studies highlight the importance of including a 
variable that taps whether US decisionmakers consider level of economic 
development, or “recipient need,” during the allocation process.  While var ous 
measures are available, in this study I employ GDP per capita (constant 2000 
dollars).29  Higher values represent higher levels of economic development for a 
country and, thus, less need. As such, American exceptionalism anticipates a 
negative relationship between GDP per capita and US foreign aid at both stages 
of the allocation process. I obtained the data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, 2009. The data are logged because of their skewed 
nature and lagged by two years.   
 
B.  Ideological Interests 
I include one ideological variable indicative of American exceptionalism in 
the form of democracy promotion.  I incorporate the variable, level of 
democracy, into my models in recognition that the United States has a 
longstanding goal of exporting American democratic values abroad and th t US 
decisionmakers have used US foreign aid as a vehicle to further this goal (Lai 
2003; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998).  Whereas Lai (2003) found that US 
                                                
29 During preliminary analysis, I tested various measure  of need to include most measures of 
GDP and GNI reported by the World Bank. I chose to employ GDP per capita because the 
figures are more complete than most GNI measures, particular during the 1970s, and tended to 




decisionmakers tend to allocate economic aid to less democratic countries, most 
studies—consistent with American exceptionalism—indicate otherwise, with 
some suggesting there is a tendency to allocate more aid to more democratic 
countries since the end of the Cold War. In keeping with past practices, I 
operationalize level of democracy using Gurr, Marshall, and Jagger’s (2009) 
Polity IV dataset.  The variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values 
denoting more democratic countries.     
 
C.  Strategic Interests 
I incorporate five variables tapping US strategic interests into my analysis, 
which previous studies have employed to explain US foreign aid allocations on 
the basis of realist expectations.30  Past studies have shown that countries that 
are allies of the United States have enjoyed greater access to US foreign aid and 
more of it (Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik et al. 1998; Lebovic 1988).  Two 
                                                
30 Other realist-oriented control variables tested in preliminary analysis but discarded because of 
poor performance, statistical insignificance, or theoretical considerations include a variable 
tapping US military troop deployments constructed by Dr. Tim Kane (2011) based on the 
DOD’s Deployment of Military Personnel by Country and a dummy variable identifying the 
location of major US military bases.  The former on rare occasion achieved statistical 
significance but, interestingly, carried a negative sign on the coefficient, indicating countries 
hosting greater numbers of troops were less likely to receive aid and to receive less of it.  This 
finding is likely due to the fact that most of largest troop deployments throughout the world for 
the years in question were to developed countries, such as German and South Korea.  I tested but 
did not include a number of regional variables.  The regional dummies generally performed 
poorly in preliminary models, save a Central American dummy that was positively related to 
economic aid in select models.  The significance of the Central America dummy in the Cold War 
gatekeeping stage, for example, could have been owig to the emphasis US decisionmakers 
placed at that time on advancing the war on drugs or other, older interests flowing from the 
Monroe Doctrine.  However, ocular inspection of the data suggested much of the dummy’s 
influence was attributable to the “non-routine” case of El Salvador.  Subsequent testing 
supported this view, with an El Salvador dummy performing comparable to the Central America 
dummy.  Since these dummies are of little theoretical interest in this study and, most 
importantly, did not affect the significance or direction of the human rights variables in my 
models, I excluded them.  I highlight the issue here so that a more detailed study of the El 
Salvador and/or Central America case might be undertak n in the future by interested 





measures of alliance are common in the literature.  Over the past decade, studies 
have tended to employ the COW dyadic alliance measure.  However, the COW 
dataset is not sufficiently updated for the purposes of this study.  Consequently, 
I fell back on the older practice of employing a dummy variable that identifies 
countries in formal alliances with the United States.  The alliances in question 
are NATO, which Poe and Meernik (1995) found to be a significant determinant 
of US military aid allocations, and major non-NATO allies, such as Thailand, 
Australia, and South Korea.  I coded the Ally variable as “1” for alliance 
members and “0” for all others.    
Population serves as a second strategic variable.  More populous countries 
on average are more important as an economic and military partner than their 
less populous brethren, according to classical realism, primarily becaus  their 
size affords the former group greater industrial and manpower capacity than the 
latter (Morgenthau 1961; Mearsheimer 2001). As such, realists anticipate US 
decisionmakers will allocate foreign aid, and more of it, to more populous 
countries. To test this claim, I incorporate population figures from the World 
Bank’s (2009) World Development Indicators Online.   I logged these figures 
because they are extremely skewed and lagged the variable two years to account 
for a country’s population at the time of allocation decisions.   
Another important, but rarely tested, strategic consideration for 
decisionmakers is whether a would-be aid recipient country is engag d in a 
militarized dispute with the United States.  Presumably, countries at 




the gatekeeping stage to receive aid and, when they do, as has been the case with 
economic aid for such countries as Syria and Iraq, less of it.  Since my preferred 
measure for this variable, the COW militarized interstate dispute dyad measure, 
was only current through 2003, I operationalized the variable using the 
international crisis behavior (ICB) dataset.  The variable is coded “1” for a 
country that was the target of direct US military intervention in a given year and 
“0” for all others. 
The forth strategic variable indicative of realist concerns is a dummy 
variable representing countries sharing a land border with another country 
perceived by US decisionmakers as posing an ideological (and possibly physical 
threat) to the United States, which I refer to hereafter as threat neighbor.  
Realists anticipate that for security and containment-relaed reasons US 
decisionmakers look favorably on these countries during the foreign aid 
allocation process (Lai 2003).  I conceptualized threats as including communist 
regimes during the Cold War, rogue regimes during the post-Cold War, and state 
sponsors of terrorism for all years in the study. Using Lai’s original threat 
proximity variable, which he graciously made available on his website, as a 
base, I updated it by coding any countries sharing a land border with one of the 
three threat groups mentioned above as “1” and all others “0”.  I coded thr at 
neighbors based on the COW’s Direct Contiguity Data, version 3.1.  I identified 
countries posing threats to the United States as follows: following convention 
(Poe 1991; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Lai 




observers of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for the years 1977 to 
1990.  Post-Cold War rogue regimes consist of those identified by Lai in his 
2003 study.  I also updated Lai’s list based on the US Government’s definition, 
which indicates rogue regimes:  
display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and 
callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are 
determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other 
advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to 
achieve the aggressive designs of the regimes; sponsor terrorism around 
the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and 
everything for which it stands (2004).  
 
I identified and coded countries that meet this definition by examining 
US State Department Background Notes and Country Reports.  I identified the 
final group tapped by the threat variable, state sponsors of terrorism, based on 
information contained on the US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator 
of Counterterrorism website. (See Appendix 3.1: Communist Countries, Rogue 
Regimes, and State Sponsors of Terrorism for a list of these countries).  Unlike 
most variables in the model, I lagged this variable by only one year.  This is to 
reflect the reality that the emergence of a threat—arising from a coup by leftist 
guerillas or a regime’s vocal opposition to the United States in the UN General 
Assembly, for example—is more quickly reported by mass media outlets and 
relayed by US diplomats to aid decisionmakers in Washington than officially 
vetted and confirmed reports of human rights abuses. 
My final strategic variable is a dummy variable identifying partners in 
the war on terror, which I include only in the war on terror era models.  On its 




terror—as countries that joined the US-led coalition established on September 
12, 2001 to confront the threat of international terrorism.  The DOD website lists 
some 60 countries as having partnered with the United States in the war on 
terror since 2001, including a narrative on each country that flags the year in 
which their partnership began.31 (See Appendix 3.1: Partners in the War on 
Terror.)  I have coded the first year in which a country was identified by DOD 
as a partner and all subsequent years, unless a country withdrew from the 
coalition (Mexico), as “1” and all other countries “0”.  To this list, I add post-
invasion Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2004), which have been key partners in 
the war on terror.  
 
D.  Economic Interests 
Finally, I include one variable measuring a country’s economic 
importance to the United States in the analysis.32  By way of reminder, 
proponents of the pluralist-business orientation argue that US aid allocations are 
determined by the preferences of dominant domestic interest groups and/or 
classes in American society.  Most emphasize the influence of US business 
groups and economic elites, given their disproportionate access to resources and 
capitalist clout, and their interest in expanding trade and opening new markets 
                                                
31 For all but four countries on the list, the year they became a partner in the war on terror is 
mentioned in an accompanying narrative on the DOD website.  Bosnia/Herzegovina, Djibouti, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Nepal were exceptions.  In these cases, various authoritative sources—
including Patterns of Global Terrorism, Country Reports, and official public statements by the 
United States or governmental representative of these countries—were employed to identify this 
date.  The complete list is available online at http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/ coalition.       
32 In preliminary analysis, I also tested a variable that Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) 
employed as a proxy for the pluralist-business orientation—free market—in addition to the 
level of US exports to and imports from a would-be aid recipient.  The variables performed 




abroad.  To this end, trade partners are viewed as prime recipients of US foreign 
aid.  In an effort to open those markets and deepen business ties, proponents of 
this argument anticipate US decisionmakers afford these partners preferential 
treatment during the aid allocation process. To speak to this pluralist/business 
orientation, I coded a trade partner variable by adding a country’s annual 
exports to and imports from the United States.  Since my preferred source, 
Kristian Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade Dataset, was current only through 2000, I 
employ the COW trade flow data.  The data are available on the COW Dataset 
Hosting Program homepage.  The export and import data are measured in 
millions of US dollars.  I lagged the data two years to reflect US 
decisionmakers’ delayed access to accurate trade statistics.    
Table 3.1 summarizes the control variables outlined in this section, 
including the theoretical orientation they tap, coding rules, and data sources.  
After the presentation of this table, I move in the next section to methodological 
issues that need be addressed and dataset preparation that must take place prior 





Table 3.1     Control Variables in the Human Rights-US Foreign Aid Models 
   










A measure of recipient “need,” in millions of 
constant 2000 US dollars, two years prior to an aid 
allocation. 








A scale ranging from +10 to -10, with higher 
scores denoting more democratic countries, 
measured one year prior to an aid allocation. 
Gurr, Marshall, and Jagger’s 





A dummy variable, with “1” denoting a NATO or 
major non-NATO ally and “0” otherwise. 
NATO and Department of 
Defense (DOD) websites, 





The natural log of population two years prior to an 
allocation. 
World Bank’s (2009) World 
Development Indicators, CD. 
Dispute Strategic/ideological 
(Security threat) 
Realism A dummy variable, with “1” denoting a country 
that is a target of US military action and “0” all 
others. 






Realism A dummy variable identifying countries that share 
a land border with a US-designated threat—a Cold 
War communist regime, post-Cold War rogue 
regime, or state sponsor of terrorism—in the year. 
Lai’s (2003) threat variable, 
updated in conjunction with 
the Correlates of War (COW) 
Direct Contiguity data. 
Partners  Strategic 
(Collective security) 
Realism A dummy variable that identifies partners in the 
war on terror. 







Exports from + imports to the United States, 
measured two years prior to the aid allocation. 





Since the mid-1990s, empirical studies on the relationship between 
human rights and US foreign aid have increasingly relied on PCTS datasets.  My 
study is no exception.  I employ a dataset of 191 potential aid rec pients—all 
countries listed in the Greenbook whether allocated aid or not—for the years 
1977-2008.    By employing such an expansive dataset, I seek to enhance the 
generalizability of this study’s findings while avoiding any possible sample 
selection bias.  But there are numerous other benefits to using PCTS data.  By 
pooling observations across both space (countries) and time (years), the dataset 
does more than simply expand the number of cases under examination.  It also 
avoids the “small N” problem an analysis of either dimension may encounter on 
its own if the number of explanatory variables exceeds the degrees of freedom 
required by an empirical model (Stimpson 1985).  Pooling likewise allows the 
researcher to test hypotheses across both dimensions simultaneously, adding
confidence to one’s findings (Schmidt 1997).  Finally, PCTS data allows the 
researcher to examine the influence of variables across casethat do not vary 
significantly within cases—so-called temporally-invariant variables—that are 
present in this study (Stimpson 1985).  Employing a PCTS dataset thus affords 
me greater overall confidence in my model results, particularly when I move 
from discussing specific findings to drawing broader conclusions and 
highlighting direction for future research.   
The benefits derived from PCTS data are not without potential costs, 




statistical workhorse of IR—OLS.  In violating these assumptions, which center 
on error term estimates, regression analysis performed on PCTS data may lead 
to over- or underestimated confidence levels in one’s findings (Beck and K tz 
1995).  The two main culprits are autocorrelation (or serial correlation) and 
heteroscedasticity.  I address each of these potentially confounding 
methodological problems below for binary and continuous dependent variables, 
since Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage allocation model makes 
use of both.  Thereafter, I address the remaining methodological pitfls of 
multicollinearity and selection bias.    
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation is a common problem in the analysis of time-series data.  
While researchers record their data in discrete temporal units (i  his case annual 
aid allocations), neither time nor aid decisions are so discrete.  Aid allocations in 
one year are often related to previous decisions, particularly regardin  amounts 
(Apodaca and Stohl 1999).  Or, to put it in methodological terms, an aid 
decision at time t is at least partially related to the decision made at t-1 
(Stimpson 1985).  This may even be the case when the decision (at t-1) was to 
deny an aid allocation, since political pressure may build thereaft  on US 
decisionmakers to provide or resume aid now (at t).  While numerous options 
are discussed in the literature to correct for autocorrelation, Beck, Katz, and 
Tucker (1998) offer one of the simplest and most widely accepted “fixes” for 
binary variables.  Following their advice, I control temporal dependency in my 




cubic splines or time dummies.33    According to Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), 
inclusion of these variables neutralizes autoregressive processes in the analysis 
by marking the “number of periods since either the start of the sample period or 
the previous occurrence of an ‘event’” when combined with either the dummy or 
spline variables (1261).34  In this study, the count variable marks the last year 
(previous occurrence) in which US decisionmakers allocated aid to a c untry 
(the event) in all models.35    
Beck and Katz (1995) recommend including either a lagged dependent 
variable or otherwise transforming the data to correct for autocorrelation when 
employing a continuous dependent variable, as is the case in my OLS models.  
Once autocorrelation is accounted for, Beck and Katz continue, the researcher 
should estimate models using OLS with robust standard errors.  While both 
recommendations allow for the accurate estimation of confidence intervals and 
improve the reliability of statistical test, I opt to include time dummies in my 
level of assistance models.36 
                                                
33 The count and natural cubic spline variables were calculated using Tucker’s (1991) BTSCS: A 
Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Data Analysis Utility (version 4.0.4) download for STATA.  
The download of the BTSCS procedure is available for m st statistical programs online at 
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rtucker/programs/btscs/btscs.html  
34 As the authors show, the spline variables essentially s ve degrees of freedom in a model that 
time dummies otherwise would consume but produce virtually identical results as time dummies.  
Testing confirmed this in my models as well.      
35 Based on advice from Dr. Lai in an e-mail exchange, this study locates the spline variables 
evenly across the country-years in question beginning with the first, third, fifth year and so forth.  
I arrived at this decision after experimenting with various placements of the splines, which had 
no substantial effects on the model results.      
36 In addition to the other possible control variables mentioned in previous footnotes that I tried 
and discarded, I also included a lagged dependent variable called “past aid” in preliminary level 
of assistance models.  My initial inclusion of the variable was in recognition of Beck and Katz’s 
(1995) methodological suggestion and Apodaca and Stohl’s (1999) substantive findings.  It also 
held the promise of making my model more robust. The variable performed as expected; it was 
positively associated with gatekeeping and level of assistance decisions in the economic and 
military aid allocation models.  However, in a number of models it tended to undercut the utility 






The second potential methodological pitfall encountered when analyzing 
PCTS data is heteroscedasticity.  OLS assumes error termsare homoscedastic, 
exhibiting constant variance across cases (Stimpson 1985).  When these term  
are not constant, the accuracy of coefficients falls into question.  In a study such 
as this with a global sample consisting of diverse countries, heteroscedasticity 
could well pose a challenge.  Therefore, in modeling both the gatekeeping and 
level of assistance stage of the foreign aid allocation process, I mploy White’s 
(1980) robust standard errors clustered on recipient countries.  White’s 
technique corrects for heteroscedasticity, when detected, but in its absence does 
not substantively alter model coefficients. 
 
Multicollinearity 
Another potentially confounding problem, multicollinearity, represents a 
situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a regression model are 
highly or perfectly correlated.  When multicollinearity is present, coefficient 
estimates for the explanatory variables may change radically and erroneously 
large standard errors appear as the data and models undergo refinements.  I 
followed Lewis-Beck’s (1980) advice for detecting multicollinearity, which 
entails first inspecting a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables for any 
correlation of 0.8 or higher.  This inspection initially gave me pause for concern 
                                                                                                                                                 
rho.  Since my primary concern was accurately modeling the two-stage aid allocation process 
identified by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) in a methodologically sound manner, I sided 
with the majority of past studies in excluding the variable from the analysis.   As with previous 




because the partners and ally variable were correlated at 0.82, slightly above the 
recommended level.37  (See Appendix 3.2: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory 
Variables for details.)  In light of this suspect correlation, I took additional steps 
to investigate the possibility that multicollinearity could pose a problem for the 
two models of eras in the war on terror that include the partners i  the war on 
terror variable.  I regressed the explanatory variables on one another and re-
specified the models by dropping variables in and out—particularly the partners 
variable—in an effort to uncover any possible confounding findings that could 
arise in the presence of multicollinearity.38 Taken together, these auxiliary tests 
alleviated my concerns.  Paying particularly close attention to the human rights 
variable during these re-specifications, I found that the sign on the coefficient 
remained the same and the magnitude of the coefficient did not change 
dramatically in the models.39 Additionally, I observed no unexpected shifts in 
the models. I thus concluded that multicollinearity did not pose a seriou  
problem for the two models.    
 
Selection Bias 
Finally, there is the issue of sample selection bias highlighted in the 
previous chapter.  In political science, this bias is most often encountered in 
                                                
37 The correlation between the two was reasonable foreseeable, however, since the DOD website 
lists NATO and Major non-NATO allies as partners in the war on terror.   
38 The highest R2 yielded during this process was 0.48, which is below the 0.7 level that typically 
warrants additional investigation (Lewis-Beck 1980).   
39 For instance, when I dropped the partner variable from the economic aid model for the era of 
the war on terror as an initial test, the coefficients on the human rights variable changed only 
slightly;  in any event, the difference are apparent in comparing the Chapter 4 and 5 models.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the only noteworthy difference in the models aside from the performance 
of the partners variable was in some of the other realist-oriented variables, which one would 




survey data.  Those who participate in a survey, either through selection or self-
selection, may be systematically different from non-participants.  As previously 
indicated, interviews conducted by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) of US 
decisionmakers suggest a similar bias is built into the foreign a d allocation 
process since only those countries decisionmakers allow to pass the gatek eping 
stage are eligible for some level of assistance thereaft .  From a methodological 
standpoint, failure to account for this bias—which poses a threat to the error 
terms—could prove detrimental to my level of assistance models by producing 
unreliable parameter estimates that lead to erroneous causal inference (Greene 
1981; Berk 1983).  As a handful of previous studies have argued (Meernik and 
Poe 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009), the Heckman (1979) 
selection model is one method of accounting for the nonrandom selection 
decision that initiates the US foreign decisionmaking process.  With the 
Heckman method, a selection term—the inverse Mills ratio—is computed for 
the selection (gatekeeping) model and incorporated into the outcome (level of 
assistance) model to compensate for bias.   Based on its theoretical applicability 
and demonstrated utility, I employ the Heckman method in this study.  
However, because its demonstrated utility is limited to only three studies in this 
subfield, I also estimate separate OLS models as a robustness check and draw 
attention to this auxiliary analysis in my discussions of findings if the results 
differ substantially from those obtained from the Heckman models; if there is no 




To provide statistically reliable results, the Heckman method requir s the 
researcher to omit at least one explanatory variable—the instrumental variable—
in the probit model from the OLS model.  In order to serve as a credible 
instrument, the variable must be critical to the selection but not the outcome 
equation.  Identifying a variable that meets that criterion in the US foreign aid 
decisionmaking process is a difficult task since it requires a vari ble that affects 
the yes/no decision to allocate aid but not the amount allocated, and 
decisionmakers’ motives are not so easily parsed into discrete stag s.  The task 
is doubly difficult since I specify 18 Heckman models that span four presidential 
administrations, three eras, and two functional groups and a credible instrument 
in one may be less so in another.  In search of such an instrument, I identified 
two candidates from past studies: the first was ally, which Demirel-Pegg and 
Moskowitz (2009) employed because “alliance should be important in the US 
decision to provide aid, but once that decision has been made it should vary little 
and be less significant in determining the amount of aid” (190).  The second was 
the GDP per capita variable, which proved a credible instrument for Lai (2003) 
because countries with high GDP per capita are less likely than poorer countries 
to “need, request, or receive assistance” (111).   The GDP per capita proved a 
credible instrument and, at times, exceptionally “strong” instrument in my 
economic models.  For the military aid models, the ally variable was credible in 
some models but not others.  I therefore turned to my dispute variable as an 




dispute with the United States are carefully scrutinized by US decisionmakers at 
the gatekeeping and less likely to be allocated assistance. 
 
Robustness Checks  
In addition to performing the robustness check on each Heckman (1979) 
model mentioned above, the results of which are reported in the coming 
chapters, I also tested the overall robustness of my findings on the human rights 
variable by moving two sets of countries in and out of my dataset.  These 
additional checks were in recognition of the possibility that my decision to 
incorporate all potential aid recipients listed in the Greenbook into my model—
i.e. a “global” sample—is not without tradeoffs.  Specifically, I focus these 
checks on the influence of wealthy democratic countries.  All of these countries 
were potential aid recipients, according to USAID, and a number have received 
economic and military aid over the years, including since the onset f the war on 
terror, which argues for their retention in the models.  Neverthelss, their 
inclusion may influence the findings of my models because of theirgr ater 
respect for human rights, on average, relative to the rest of countries listed as 
potential aid recipients by the Greenbook.   With this in mind, I excluded and 
reintroduced these countries into the models to observe whether the sign on the 
human rights coefficient “flipped” or any variable that achieved statistical 
significance became insignificant.            
The first set of countries I excluded from my models consisted of those 




human rights variable, in no model did the sign on the coefficient flip from 
positive to negative (or vice versa).  Additionally, those variables that had 
achieved statistical significance in the models reported in Chapters 4-5 remained 
significant after the removal of G8 countries.  To push the robustness ch ck 
further, I also excluded a wider set of democracies—OECD countries—from my 
models.  The signs on the human rights coefficients remained unchanged in all 
economic and military aid models despite the exclusion of these countries, 
including for the human rights variable.  However, at the gatekeeping stage of 
the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror economic aid models, the 
statistical significance of the variable changed from significant to slightly below 
significance.  Interestingly, further investigation indicated this change in 
significance was not attributable to the exclusion of the OECD as a group.  
Rather, it was attributable to the removal of a select subset of OECD countries 
that regularly received aid—including Turkey, Spain, and Greece—from the 
models.  Given the theoretical importance of these countries to the war on terror, 
as denoted by their designation as partners in the war on the DOD website, I 
opted for their continued inclusion in the models.  Nevertheless, the OECD 
check highlights the sensitivity of US economic aid models—even when the 
dependent variable has been logged to mitigate the influence of outliers—to 
select cases (at least at the gatekeeping stage) and the eed to carefully consider 
and justify sample selection criteria in this vein of literature.  I return to these 






I now turn to dataset preparation.  As you will recall, the first set of 
hypotheses explore the linkage between human rights and US foreign aid 
allocations under the G.W. Bush administration and previous administrations 
bound by the human rights provision.40  Preparing the dataset for administration 
models is a relatively straightforward process.  Presidential administrations are 
coded according to a president’s term in office: Reagan (1981-88), George H.W. 
Bush (1989-92), Clinton (1993-2000), and George W. Bush (2001-08).  The task 
requires more thought, however, for the second set of hypotheses that examin  
the war on terror as a distinct era in US foreign aid allocati ns.  As with past 
studies (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009), the Cold War era 
includes the years 1977 to 1990.  However, deciding where the post-Cold War 
ends and war on terror begins is more conceptually “sticky” than i  first appears.  
According to a Congressional Quarterly Weekly (2001) article, Congress in 
October 2001 deferred a decision to incorporate funding specifically e rmarked 
for the war on terror into the US foreign aid program.  The same article indicates 
that Congress made that decision the following year.  On its face, this would 
suggest that for the purposes of US foreign aid allocations the war on terror 
began not in late 2001 but 2002. However, this line of reasoning ignores the 
possibility that US decisionmakers may reprogram aid (Poe et al. 1994).  In the 
absence of reporting requirements, reprogramming is difficult to detect.  But a 
CRS report on aid allocations following the war on terror provides some support 
                                                
40 Though President Carter was the first administration o be bound by the mandate, I excluded 
his administration from the analysis because it wasfree to “redirect” existing aid allocations to 




for the view that existing aid funds were reprogrammed as a reult of the onset 
of the war on terror (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005).  In any event, the possibility 
cannot be ruled out.  Consequently, this study identifies the post-Cold War years 
as 1991-2000 and the war on terror as those years since. 
Finally, the 3rd set of hypotheses explores US aid allocations to partners 
and non-partners in the war on terror.  To accommodate these hypotheses, I 
divided my dataset into partners and non-partners.  The DOD list of partners in 




The variables and methodological issues discussed above are combined 
into models and tested against the hypotheses related to presidential 
administrations in the next chapter.  The same is done for the era and partner-
related hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.  By way of reminder, in the 
coming empirical chapters these hypotheses perform double duty; they are tsted 
using models that employ economic and military aid allocations as the 
dependent variable.  To smooth the integration of findings into the existing 
literature, this study follows the practices of constructing separate models for 
each administration and era, and for partners and non-partners in the war on 
terror.  Thus, Chapter 4 includes eight models (four administrations x two 
dependent variables), Chapter 5 six models (three eras x two dependent 
variables), and Chapter 6 four models (partners and non-partners x two 




and this progression of models in mind, I turn to the empirical analysis of 




Chapter 4: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid




In the previous chapter I operationalized concepts to assist in the 
construction of Heckman (1979) models that explore the relationship between 
human rights and US economic and military aid allocations before and after 
9/11.  In this, the first of three empirical chapters, I present the results for the 
first set of models.41  By way of reminder, the models examine the human 
rights-foreign aid linkage under the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical 
and comparative perspective, the three previous administrations also bound by 
the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.  Table 4.1 and 4.2 
report the results of my two-stage models for economic aid and military aid 
decisionmaking, respectively.  In my discussions of findings, I first examine the 
summary statistics associated with the models.  I then examine the actual model 
results for the gatekeeping and level of assistance stages, which are presented 
side-by-side in each table.  The primary focus of these discussions is the 
performance of the human rights variable in the G.W. Bush administration 
model—highlighted in the first row—and its bearing on my administraton-
related hypotheses.  I then draw attention to the results of statistically significant 
                                                
41 I constructed the models in Chapters 4-6 using STATA-Intercooled (version 10.1) with 





control variables that assist in my secondary goal of evaluating the relative 
explanatory power of the three theoretical approaches researchers typically 
employ in studies of US foreign aid.  I examine the performance of the control 
variables indicative of American exceptionalism, realism, and the pluralist-
business explanation of aid allocations in turn.  To further understanding of the
influence of human rights considerations on aid allocations, I also include a 
companion to the results table that reports the substantive effects o  the human 
rights variable—provided it achieves statistical significance—on the predicted 
values of aid allocations for the model of interest (the G.W. Bush 
administration).  Additionally, I report predicted aid values for select other 
variables of interest in the main text.  Finally, and on a stylistic note, rather than 
proceed in a mechanical fashion, examining the gatekeeping and level of 
assistance stage results in turn for each model, I interweave the two in my 
discussions of findings.  This tack enables a structured but flowing narrative of 
the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid allocations to develop.  
With this introduction in mind, I now turn to the models for economic aid 
allocations by presidential administration.           
  
Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations by 
Presidential Administration   
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the G.W. Bush administration 
reframed the rationale for US economic aid.  Administration officials relied 
heavily on the human rights rhetoric through the reframing process (Apodaca 




States would allocate economic aid, and more of it, in an effort to reduce the 
global inequality and poverty administration officials argued were the root 
causes of terrorism (G.W. Bush 2002).  In helping countries improve the living 
conditions of their citizens, the administration reasoned that these citizens would 
embrace the promise of a brighter future rather than radical Islamic ideology.  
Promoting “hope was an answer to terror,” and economic aid a vehicle for its 
spread (G.W. Bush 2002: 1).  To quicken this spread, the G.W. Bush 
administration established two new funds—the Global AIDS Initiative in 2003 
and Millennium Challenge Account in 2004—that are folded in with all other 
economic aid funds into the dependent variable.   
Looking first at the summary statistics, reported in the last row of Table 
4.1, the first item of note is that the rho is statistical significance across the four 
administration models, indicating the selection and outcome equations in each 
are correlated.  Thus, my initial administration models lend empirical support to 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptualization of the US 
economic aid decisionmaking and suggest that I am accounting for the selection 
bias inherent to the allocation process.42  The second is that the G.W. Bush 
administration apparently acted on its declaration.  Having refram d the 
rationale for economic aid, the G.W. Bush administration dramatically expanded 
its scope.  The percentage of cases passing the gatekeeping stage and allocated 
aid at the level of assistance stage in the models grew to nearly 89 percent 
                                                
42 In modeling the second stage (OLS) level of assistance decisions as a single equation, to check 
for model robustness, I obtained essentially the same results as those reported in Table 4.1.  
While the magnitude of the coefficients changed, owing to the removal of the selection bias 




(1054/1189) under the administration, 11 percent higher than the next closest 
administration, Clinton’s, and 22 percent higher than that of the Reagan 
administration, which allowed the fewest cases to passed the gate.43   
US economic aid under the G.W. Bush administration grew in real terms 
as well, to higher than any time since the post-World War II reconstruction 
period of the early 1950s (Lawson 2009), with top recipients including post-
invasion Iraq and Afghanistan followed by partners in the war on terror like 
Pakistan and Russia and then Israel.  Lawson (2009) goes on to report that most 
of this growth—allocated as cash grants rather than the historically more 
common loans—was guided by the administration’s “more strategic snse of 
importance, cast frequently in terms of contributing to the global war on terror” 
(2).  Despite the rationale for and rhetoric employed to reframe US economic aid 
and justify greater aid flows, critics argue that US decisionmakers implemented 
these increases with no regard for the human rights provision or the American 
exceptionalism it embodies (Mertus 2008; Apodaca, 2006; Christie 2008).  The 
empirical results reported in Table 4.1 speak to this argument by highlighting 
the role human rights considerations played in the administration’s new 
framework for economic aid.  
Row 1, columns 4 and 8, report the performance of the human rights 
variable for the G.W. Bush administration model at the gatekeeping and level of 
                                                
43 This calculation is based on the number of uncensored bservations (those country-year cases 
that advanced beyond the gatekeeping stage) divided by the total number of observations (all 
country-year cases that in theory could pass the gat keeping stage) in the models.  Percentages 
for the remaining administration are: Reagan 67 percent (590/874), G.H.W. Bush 76 percent 




assistance stage, respectively.  The human rights variable is highly statistically 
significant (.01 level) at both stages of the G.W. Bush model.  Moreove , the 
magnitude of the coefficients suggests human rights had a greater effect under 
the G.W. Bush administration than the next closest—the Clinton 
administration—or any other.    The findings thus lend no empirical support to 
critics’ claims about the failure of human rights to influence post-9/11 economic 
aid decisionmaking.  I therefore reject H1 (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of 
assistance (economic).   But neither do the findings lend support to my 
theoretical orientation.  American exceptionalism, the same I understand as 
embodied in the human rights provision, which anticipates a positive sign on the 
coefficients, is notably absent.  The coefficient’s sign at both stages of the 
allocation process is negative.  The findings thus suggest that decisionmakers in 
the G.W. Bush administration neither created incentives for good human rights
behavior nor disincentives for poor behavior when allocating economic aid 
during the war on terror.   
The substantive effects of this negative human rights variable are 
reported in Table 4.1.1.  The G.W. Bush administration allocated enormous 
sums of economic aid to countries with poor human rights records in hopes of 
advancing the war on terror. Strong examples of this tendency drawn f om the 
dataset include Pakistan, Sudan, and Azerbaijan.  The average annual predicted 
aid amounts reported in the table show the effects of this allocation s rategy.  
The total change in the human rights variable, highlighted in the fifth row, 




rights (an improvement on my human rights variable from “1” to “5”) could 
expect a 95 percent reduction in the predicted amount of economic aid.  
Moreover, the previous four rows indicate an average reduction of around 57 
percent in predicted aid amounts of aid as human rights practices improved from 
one point to the next.  While intuitively one might expect such reductions, since 
countries with the best human rights records almost always are wealthy 
democracies with little need for economic aid, the findings still run counter to 
the plain language of the human rights provision and its aim of allocating aid in 
ways that advance human rights abroad.   
To seat the relationship uncovered for human rights and economic aid 
under the G.W. Bush administration into historical and comparative perspective, 
and to provide an exploratory answer to hypotheses two and three, I now 
introduce the results for previous presidential administrations bound by the 
human rights provision into the discussion. Donnelly (1995) has persuasively 
argued that human rights norms have become more and more embedded in US 
foreign policy decisionmaking, particularly under the Reagan administration, but 
the results suggest the US foreign aid decisionmaking process may be an 
exception. Incorporating the findings from past administrations into my 
discussion strongly suggests a commitment to promote human rights through the 
US economic aid program has been lacking for some time.  I again need look no 
further than the G.W. Bush administration’s immediate predecessor; the human 
rights variable is negative and statistically significant in the Clinton 




entered the White House criticizing G.H.W. Bush for failing to press for human 
rights improvements abroad, but the findings suggest his administration did no 
better (and at the gatekeeping stage worse) (Apodaca 2005). If Clinton acted on 
his campaign pledge to make human rights considerations a pillar of his fore gn 
policy approach, they are conspicuously absent from the allocation process.   
Under the Clinton administration, Russia, Colombia, Egypt, and other countries 
with poor human rights records received many of the largest allocations of 
economic aid. With these historical comparisons in mind, I reject H2a-b 
(economic) and conclude that decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration 
were not the first to fail to employ human rights considerations n a manner 
consistent with the requirements of the human rights provision.  In fact, while 
the magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat lessened, in all but the G.H.W. 
Bush and Reagan model at the gatekeeping and level of assistance t ge, 
respectively, the human rights coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant across all models. This suggests on average that greater spect for 
human rights has not improved the prospects of a county receiving aid or the 
amount received, ceteris paribus. For previous administrations, then, my 
findings mirror those of Poe and Sirirangsi (1994) and Carleton and Stohl
(1985), among others, in suggesting that the influence of human rights 
considerations on economic aid decisionmaking has not been as Congressional 
drafters intended.  Based on these consistently negative findings, then, w ich 
deal a significant blow to my expectations of American exceptionalism, I also 




TABLE 4.1     Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration    
 
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid 
(gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) for the G.W. Bush administraton and, for historical and comparative 
perspective, past administrations also bound by the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance At. 
  
Gatekeeping Stage 
(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 




































































































































































   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).  ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  
Reagan: total obs. = 874. Uncensored obs. = 590. Rho = -.76.  Wald test of rho = 0.001.  Log likelihood = -1304.99.  
G.H.W. Bush: total obs. = 468. Uncensored obs. = 359. Rho = -.47. Wald test of rho = 0.01. Log likelihood = -822.59.  
Clinton: total obs. = 986. Uncensored obs. = 776. Rho = -.61. Wald test of rho = 0.01. Log Likelihood =-1687.46.  





       
        
Table 4.1.1   The Substantive Effect of Human Rights on the Predicted Values of Economic Aid Allocated by 
the G.W. Bush Administration     
  






Initial predicted  
economic aid amount 
(b)  
Predicted economic 
aid amount after 
variable change 
(c)  
Change in predicted 
economic aid amount,  
b-a 
(d)  
Percentage change in 
predicted amount of 
economic aid,  c/a 
G.W. Bush Administration    
      Human Rights,  













          Change 2 to 3 69.2 32.2 -37 -53% 
          Change 3 to 4 32.2 14.7 -17.4 -54% 
          Change 4 to 5 14.7 6.6 -8.1 -55% 
          Total change 1 to 5 147.4 6.6 -140.8 -95% 
  
Note: Values derived from the G.W. Bush administration model presented in Table 4.1. Values have been converted into constant millions of 
US dollars and are calculated for those countries passing the initial gatekeeping stage of the allocati n process that were allocated some level 
of assistance (uncensored observations).   Predicted amounts and percentage were calculated holding all other variables constant while 
changing the value of the human rights variable.    







Turning to the control variables, and in doing so my secondary goal of 
evaluating the explanatory power of the three primary theories f aid-giving, I 
find support for American exceptionalism.  Though the GDP per capita vari ble 
performed poorly at the level of assistance stage in my preliminary analysis, 
which along with theoretical considerations led to its use as my Heckman (1979) 
instrumental variable, it performs as expected at the gatekeeping stage.  The 
variable is statistically significant and negative across all g tekeeping stages, 
suggesting decisionmakers consistently take into account recipient ne d when 
determining which countries will gain access to US economic aid. In the case of 
the G.W. Bush model, the finding also suggests that the administration foll wed 
through on its reframing commitment to attempt to address global poverty.  
Interestingly, the administration under which need influenced aid allocations 
most—if we take the magnitude of the coefficient as an indication—was that of 
G.H.W. Bush, whom many political commentators credit as the first 
compassionate conservative (Wead 1986).    
Additionally, apart from the G.W. Bush administration’s gatekeeping and 
G.H.W. Bush’s level of assistance decisions, decisionmakers exhibited a 
commitment to American exceptionalism by rewarding higher levels of 
democracy with increased access to and levels of economic aid.  The democracy 
variable is consistently positive and on average moderately statistic lly 
significant (0.05 level) across the models.  Under the G.H.W. Bush 
administration democracy promotion rhetorically served as an important 




into history.  The G.H.W. Bush administration established two economic aid 
funds—the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) and Freedom for 
Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support 
(FREEDOM)—specifically to facilitate democratic transition in former Soviet 
bloc countries (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005).  The findings suggest that US 
decisionmakers under the G.H.W. Bush administration considered a would-be 
recipient country’s level of democracy before admitting it into the pool of 
intended aid recipients, as did Clinton’s.  The same cannot be said of the G.W. 
Bush administration, though the findings suggest his tended to hand out the 
largest economic incentives.  Predicted economic aid increases for moving from 
lowest to highest levels of democracy (-10 to 10 on the Polity scale) ranged from 
a low of $18.7 million to a high of $43.6 million for the Clinton and G.W. Bush 
administration, respective.         
Looking at the realist-oriented variables, it is worth noting that a number 
perform contrary to realist expectations.  For example, in the two instances in 
which the ally variable achieves statistical significance, the coefficient carries a 
negative sign;  decisionmakers in the Clinton administration wereless likely to 
grant an ally access to economic aid and those in the G.W. Bush administration 
lesser amounts of aid.  The finding is particularly interesting when one considers 
that the ally variable includes major non-NATO allies such as Thailand and the 
Philippines, which are less developed countries important to US security b t 
may lack the requisite resources to meet their bilateral and collective security 




dispute variable, for every administration it apparently was more important to 
check enemies than reward friends during the allocation process.    
Additionally, decisionmakers showed no favoritism toward more 
populous countries and countries sharing a land border with a US-designated 
threat.  Only at the level of assistance stage and, even then, only in select cases 
did either variable achieve statistical significance and carry the positive sign that 
realist anticipate.  One such interesting case is the threat neighbor variable in the 
Reagan administration model.  As G.W. Bush would do some two decades later, 
the Reagan administration—which was also populated, at least up to Reagan’s 
reelection, with realist-oriented ideologues—proclaimed international terrorism 
the chief threat to the United States and freedom-loving peoples everywhere 
(Apodaca 2005).  Unlike the G.W. Bush administration, though, the Reagan 
administration viewed leftist—particularly communist—ideology as the 
wellspring of this terrorism and allocated significant amounts of ec nomic aid to 
countries bordering regimes espousing this ideology.  These countries could 
expect on average to receive $178 million dollars more in predicted eonomic 
aid annually than others.  Honduras and Costa Rica, both of which shared a 
border with the US-designated threat in the 1980s (Nicaragua), are strong 
examples of such countries.  Moreover, other countries on the frontlines of the
battle against communism and the war on drugs could expect similar preferential 
treatment.  The Philippines, Pakistan, and El Salvador were among the countries 
receiving the most from the Reagan administration—a policy the G.H.W. Bush 




Nevertheless, the G.H.W. Bush administration did depart from its predecessor in 
deemphasizing threat proximity as a primary determinant of aid levels, which 
suggests a level of pragmatism missing under the Reagan administration’s 
mostly counter-communist allocations.  Finally, countries engaged in a d spute 
with the United States, such as Libya (on several occasions), were less likely to 
pass the gate under Reagan and Clinton and to receive less aid under the G.H.W. 
and G.W. Bush administrations.                  
As for the pluralist-business orientation, the G.H.W. Bush administration 
–again expressing its pragmatism—favored a foreign policy approach that 
emphasized economic over ideological goals, and it shows in the trade partner 
variable (2005).  For the first time, the trade partner variable become positive 
and statistically significant under the administration.  The findings i dicate that 
decisionmakers have since continued to favor trade partners at the gatek eping 
stage, where the variable is positive and statistically significant.   In short, the 
higher the volume of trade (exports + imports) between the United States and a 
country, the higher the probability of the latter receiving economic aid.  Mexico 
and Brazil are two trade partners drawn from my dataset exemplifying this 
trade-aid connection.  Having passed the gate, however, trade partners did not 











Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Military Aid Allocations by 
Presidential Administration   
 
In contrast to economic aid program, the G.W. Bush administration had 
no need to reframe the rationale for military aid after the onset of the war on 
terror.  Military aid remained an avenue for friends and allies of the United 
States to acquire US military training and hardware (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004).  
Rather, the change to US military aid program under G.W. Bush was one of 
increased scope.  The summary statistics attest to this increase and, as a brief 
aside, the advisability of modeling military aid allocations as a two-stage 
process based on the statistical significance of rho across all models.44  
Decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration allowed roughly 67 percent 
(795/1189) of countries to pass the gatekeeping stage and receive some level of 
military assistance, which was the first percentage increase since the Reagan 
administration—also intent on dismantling an international threat (throug  
economic aid as well).  Yet this increase was only three percentage-points above 
that of the Clinton and G.H.W. Bush administrations, both at 64 percent.45  For 
G.W. Bush that access including granting post-invasion Afghanistan and Ir q 
and Pakistan and Jordan some of the largest military aid packages constru ted, 
verging on or in the billions of dollars, making these countries some of the top 
                                                
44 As with the economic model, I ran a single-stage (OLS) equation as a robustness check on my 
findings.  In the case of the G.W. Bush model, the human rights variable also failed to achieve 
statistical significance at the level of assistance stage—which affords additional confidence in 
the results reported in Table 4.2.  However, in the single-stage equation, the threat neighbor 
variable—which is only weakly (0.1 level) significant—became statistically insignificant.  As 
such, I consider its statistical significance in the Heckman (1979) models as tentative empirical 
support only.    
45 Based on the calculation method outlined in the previous footnote, percentages are as follows: 





aid recipients.  To determine whether this percentage increase under the G.W. 
Bush administration was associated with the human rights-military aid linkage 
critics contend, I draw attention to Table 4.2.                    
Looking at the G.W. Bush administration model, again located in 
columns 4 and 8, the sign on the coefficient suggests that human rights had a 
negative effect on military aid allocations at both the gatekeeping and level of 
assistance stages under the G.W. Bush administration.  However, unlike in the 
case of economic aid, the coefficient fails to achieve statistical significance at 
either stage of the allocation process.  The findings thus suggest that 
decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration did not take into account 
human rights considerations when allocating military aid, as critics contend.  I 
therefore accept H1a-b (military) and conclude that human rights concerns 
failed to significantly influence the administration’s military aid 
decisionmaking.  This failure to heed the human rights provision in allocating 
military aid was not without precedent.  The same may be said of previous 
administrations under examination as well.  Since the failure was not a first, I 
reject H2a-b (military). 
Though the human rights variable carries a positive sign at the 
gatekeeping stage for the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administration models, 
which is my first findings suggestive of American exceptionalism and adherence 
to the human rights provision, neither achieves statistical significa ce.  
Moreover, where statistical significance is achieved—in the same two models at 




historical context, Cohen (1982) found “extraordinary circumstances” 
influenced the Carter administration’s allocation decisions—to Indonesia in 
particular—despite Carter’s personal commitment to advancing human rights.46  
Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson (1984) found that this influence arose at the level 
of assistance stage and persisted through the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush years.  I 
have seemingly found this same influence, which led decisionmakers in the 
Reagan administration to allocate annually predicted military aid in the amount 
of roughly $250 million to countries with some of the poorest human rights 
records, as in the case of El Salvador in the mid-1980s.  Thus, I reject H3a-b 
(military) too.         
In examining the two control variables also indicative of American 
exceptionalism, I find less support for my theoretical orientation han in the 
economic aid models.  GDP per capita is negatively related to gatekeeping 
decisions in all but the Clinton model, though its statistical significance is weak 
(0.1) in the Reagan model.  Nevertheless, this suggests decisionmakers generally 
sought to “screen out” wealthier countries from the military aid program so as to 
bolster the capabilities of less developed (and democratic) friends (Poe and 
Meernik 1995: 406).  Interestingly, the wealthiest of those not screened out 
found favor during the allocation of military aid under the Clinton and G.W. 
Bush administration.  Poe and Meernik (1995) found a similar dynamic at work 
                                                
46 For example, Carter denied a number of abusive Latin American countries US security 
assistance over the course of his presidency: Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
and Nicaragua, among others. At the same time, however, the Carter administration continued to 
allocate security assistance to Indonesia despite the government’s well-documented human 
rights abuses by claiming that there was not a consistent pattern of human rights violations—as 
defined in Section 502B—since Jakarta had a plan in place to someday release its political 




in their study of military aid allocations in the 1980s, though their GDP per 
capita variable fell short of statistical significance in thelevel of assistance 
stage.  A review of the data explains the counterintuitive finding in this study: 
South Korea and Greece were among some of the highest GDP per capita 
countries in the pool of intended recipients, securing in some years upwards of 
$700 million in military aid.  Additionally, the democracy variable proves a 
fairly consistent and positive influence on gatekeeping decisions, as American 
exceptionalism anticipates.  Aside from the Reagan administration, 
administrations have consistently granted countries with higher levels of 
democracy greater access to military aid.  But these higher lev ls seemingly 
were of no value in securing larger aid packages.      
Interestingly, the realist-oriented variables meet with mixed results under 
most administrations; but, where they achieve statistical significa ce, the 
variables exert substantially greater influence on US military aid 
decisionmaking than others in the models. Countries engaged in a dispute with 
the United States, not surprisingly, were less likely to gain access to US military 
aid irrespective of presidential administration and those bordering a communist, 
rogue regime, or state sponsor of terror more likely under the Reagan 
administration.  Predictably, decisionmakers in every administration pr vided 
allies with greater amounts of military aid—none more so than t e Reagan 
administration based on the magnitude of the coefficient.  As with its economic 
model, the Reagan administration tended to give the greatest sums of ilitary 




Apodaca (2005) found, the results also indicate that decisionmakers in the 
G.H.W. Bush administration typically took their cues from the Reagan 
administration in terms of the considerations affecting aid allocati ns.  One 
interesting difference, however, is the tendency of the G.H.W. Bush 
administration (and its successors) to extend greater amounts of military aid to 
countries neighboring threats.  Lai (2003) found that as the threat of communism 
faded the G.H.W. Bush administration shifted some aid from allies to countries 
sharing a border with rogue regimes or state sponsor of terrors; my findings tend 
to suggest the same.  
Finally, the trade partner carried the positive coefficient devotes of the 
pluralist-business explanation of US military aid anticipate in only half of the 
models.  However, the variable failed to achieve even weak statistical 
significance in every administration model and at both stages of the allocation 
process.  Not surprisingly, then, the issue of conflict or cooperation wth a 
potential recipient tended to dictate which country would receive military aid 









TABLE 4.2    Human Rights and US Military Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration    
 
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating military aid (gatekeeping 
stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) for the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, 
past administrations also bound by the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act. 
  
Gatekeeping Stage 
(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01(two-tailed). ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.    
Reagan: total obs. = 874. Uncensored obs. = 505. Rho = -.88 Wald test of rho = 0.01.  Log likelihood = -1418.3. 
G.H.W. Bush: total obs. = 468 Uncensored obs. = 301. Rho = -.21. Wald test of rho = 0.02 Log likelihood = -794.47. 
Clinton: total obs. = 986. Uncensored obs. = 628. Rho = -.33. Wald test of rho = 0.01. Log Likelihood =-1560.71.  





  The findings for the economic and military aid models presented i 
this first of three empirical chapters produced interesting and sometimes 
unexpected results.  The results supported critics’ claims about the human 
rights-foreign aid linkage during the G.W. Bush administration in the case of 
military allocations for H1 but not economic aid or military allocations 
elsewhere. As for economic aid, the findings indicate that a negative relationship 
between human rights and US foreign aid existed under the administration and 
others.   Thus, I found no support for my theoretical expectations of American 
exceptionalism based on the human rights variable.   While decisionmakers in 
the G.W. Bush administration allocated economic aid to countries with some of 
the poorest human rights records, presumably to advance the war on terror, th  
findings nevertheless suggest that they kept an eye toward promoting democracy 
and addressing recipient need (GDP per capita).   The findings also indicate that 
recipient need influenced all other administration’s decisions to all cate 
economic aid and all but one administration’s decisions military aid, which 
along with the results for the democracy variable lend some support to American 
exceptionalism apart from human rights.  However, as with previous studie , 
realist-oriented variables when statistically significant and in the anticipated 
direction exerted on average the most influence on aid allocations (Lebovic 
1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Poe et al. 1994) and the pluralist/business-





Chapter 5: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid






  In this second empirical chapter I examine US economic and military 
aid allocations during the war on terror relative to previous eras.  P t studies of 
aid allocations during the Cold War and post-Cold War included two or more 
presidential administrations per era (Meernik, Krueger, Poe 1994; Lai 2003; 
Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009).  This study includes only one for the war 
on terror—the G.W. Bush administration.  The absence of a second or third 
administration in the war on terror model may prompt some readers to object to 
the forthcoming analysis, concluding that it is for now premature.  I am 
sympathetic to this position in light of the findings from the previous chapter 
that there has been a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
human rights and US economic aid since the onset of the war on terr r.  My 
hope is that the current administration is, and its successors will, prosecute the 
war on terror in ways that not only create the incentives for improvements in 
human rights practices but also their overall human rights record during the 
allocation of US foreign aid.  However, objections notwithstanding, there are 
theoretical and empirical grounds to suggest the war on terror may constitute a 
new and ongoing era in allocations.  From a theoretical standpoint, human rights 




trappings of an “era” that will structure aid allocations for decades.  As Apodaca 
(2006) puts it, “although the war on terrorism began as a response to th  events 
of 9/11, it soon became a global and permanent condition” hostile to the 
promotion of human rights (176).  Christie (2008) also notes the war on terr r’s 
permanency, noting that the war “by default [has] become the central feature of 
international relations in the period since 9/11” and currently is entrenched as a 
“paradigm” in US foreign policy (13-15).  Lebovic’s (1998) empirical finding 
that once a US foreign policy paradigm—in his analysis the Cold War threat of 
communism—is established, US “policy resides less in the elected leadership 
than within the forces impinging on it,” which makes US foreign aid 
“surprisingly impervious to change,” further drives home the point (129-130).  
The results of preliminary analyses also provide moderate to strong empirical 
support for modeling the war on terror as a distinct era.  When entered into 
multivariate models for all years (1977-2008) as a dummy variable, the war on 
terror variable was positive and strongly statistically significant (0.01) for 
economic aid at both stages of the allocation process and moderately st istically 
significant (0.05) for military aid allocations.  Bearing these findings in mind, I 
thus accept era-related arguments as deserving of empirical examination and 
treat the G.W. Bush administration’s allocations as the first (but probably not the 
last) guided by the paradigmatic forces of the war on terror.   
Given this overlap in the models with the previous chapter, I neither 




effects of the human rights variable.47  Instead, I move immediately to an 
examination of the influence of the human rights variable during the war on 
terror relative to the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  However, th  overlap 
between the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror model is not complete.  
As previously noted, to demonstrate the theoretical importance of studying 
partners in the war on terror as a distinct group of aid recipients, the purpose of 
Chapter 6, I include a dummy variable identifying partners in the war on terror 
models.  With this distinguishing factor in mind, I turn first to my discussion of 
findings for human rights and economic aid allocations. 
  
Discussion of Findings:   Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations by 
Era 
 
Table 5.1 presents the model results for the relationship between human 
rights and US economic aid allocations for the war on terror and Cold War and 
post-Cold War eras.  Looking first at the summary statistics, reported in the last 
row of the table, and focusing on the number of total and uncensored 
observations in each model, there is an interesting historical trend.  Of the 1,297 
cases eligible for economic aid during the Cold War, US decisionmakers 
permitted 899 (69 percent) to pass the gatekeeping stage and allocated them 
some level of aid.  This percentage climbs by double-digits to 79 percent 
(1084/1369) for the post-Cold War and, as previously presented, 88 percent after 
                                                
47 Readers should note, however, that the model results differ somewhat based on the inclusion 
of the partners variable.  Most importantly, though, the inclusion of the variable did not 
substantially impact the performance of the human rights variable.  On a related note, the 
findings for the single-stage level of assistance models did not change substantially either owing 




the onset of the war on terror.  Tarnoff and Lawson (2009) conclude the most 
striking trends in economic aid allocations over the past two decades has been 
the growth of development assistance, such as humanitarian and food aid, and 
the increased emphasis on security assistance since the onset of th  war on 
terror.  No doubt these factors are undercurrents to the trend uncovered here.  
The summary statistics also provide support for Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s 
(1985) two-stage conceptualization of the aid allocation process when analyzing 
aid by era in the form of statistically significant rho parameters across all 
models.  The Wald test of rho thus supports the general utility of modeling aid 
allocations as gatekeeping and level of assistance decisions, as was the case for 
economic and military aid decisionmaking in the previous chapter.  For insights 
into the role human rights considerations played in these decisions over the eras 





TABLE 5.1     Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations by Era 
    
  
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid 
(gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage), 1977-2008. 
  
Gatekeeping Stage 
(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 
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Partners in War on 
Terror  
---b ---b -.053 
(.255) 
---b ---b .629*** 
(.218) 
























   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).   Time dummies omitted.   
---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  ---b Only applicable to the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror models.   
Cold War: total obs. = 1297. Uncensored obs. = 899. Rho = -.69.  Wald test of rho = 0.0000. Log likelihood = -1945.15.   
Post-Cold War: total obs. = 1369. Uncensored obs. = 1084. Rho = -.56.  Wald test of rho = 0.02. Log likelihood = -2386.1.   





Row 1 of Table 5.1 highlights the performance of the human rights 
variable in each era.  To provide historical and comparative perspective on the t 
the human rights variable in the war on terror, I first look at the post-Cold War 
model.  Did human rights considerations exert a positive effect on economic aid 
allocations during the post-Cold War that was nullified by the onset of the war 
on terror?  The model indicates the answer is “no.”  The human rights variable is 
negative at both stages of the allocation process and, as Demirel-Pegg and 
Moskowitz (2009) found, statistically significant (0.05 level or greater).  The 
finding deals another blow to my expectations of American exceptionalism and 
seemingly undermines the consensus formed at Cold War’s end that the 
influence of human rights considerations would increase as the threat of 
communism receded (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Korb 2008; Clark and 
O’Connor 1997; Stark 2000; Apodaca 2006).   Indeed, the human rights 
variable’s negative and statistically significant post-Cold War performance 
arguably offers a glimpse of what is to come in the post-9/11 environment.  
Consequently, I reject H4a-b (economic), and find cause to question the notion 
that the post-Cold War era entailed a peace dividend that led to an increased 
emphasis on human rights in US foreign policy.   
Turning to the human rights variable in the Cold War model provides 
some hope for American exceptionalism.  As Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) 
found, the human rights variable is positive at the gatekeeping stage.  But the 
possible support this finding could have provided to American exceptionalism is 




Additionally, the coefficient is negative (though again statistically insignificant) 
at the level of assistance stage.  The findings thus suggest that human rights 
considerations on average had no discernable relationship with US economic aid 
allocations during the Cold War decisionmaking process.  Thus, no support is 
found for the claim that the war on terror ended a positive era in human rights 
that subsumed the post-Cold War (and possibly the Cold War) at both the 
gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the economic aid allocation process.  
On the contrary, the findings suggest a positive era in human rights—one 
consistent with my theoretical expectations and required by the human rights 
provision—has yet to be realized.  As such, I also reject H5a-b (economic).  
Turning to the control variables that are secondary indicators of 
American exceptionalism, I find recipient need (GDP per capita) is negative 
across all eras and significant at the 0.01 level for all gatekeeping stage 
decisions.  This finding supports the notion that American exceptionalism in fact 
informs gatekeeping decisions even in the face of the self-serving donor 
interests, such as advancing the war on terror.  Moreover, these countries 
regularly are selected by US decisionmakers to receive needed conomic aid 
despite an apparent overall lack of realist-oriented strategic importance to the 
United States.  Strong supporting examples include numerous African and 
Southeast Asian countries; Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia 
and Bangladesh and Cambodia are a few examples.  It is worth noting at this 
point that the relationship between need and US economic aid is one of the most 




enduring finding is mounting in this study as well (McKinlay & Little 1979; 
Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Meernik and Poe 1995; Meernik, Krueger, 
and Poe 1998; Lai 2003).  The same may be said of the democracy variable; 
with the exception of the war on terror gatekeeping stage, the variable is 
moderate to highly statistically significant across all eras.  The findings thus 
indicate that US decisionmakers over the past three decades have consistently 
sought to promote democracy by allowing more democratic countries acc s to 
economic aid and allocating these countries greater amounts of aid.       
As for realist explanations of economic aid allocations, neither the 
population nor ally variable is in the anticipated direction at the gat keeping 
stage, though more populous countries did receive greater amounts of aid in the 
Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  In contrast to Lai’s (2003) finding, the 
realist-oriented threat neighbor variable led to increased aid allocations to 
countries sharing a border with a communist neighbor or state sponsor of ter or 
during the Cold War—West Germany and South Korea are strong examples, 
respectively—but not to those sharing a border with a rogue regime or sponsor 
of terror thereafter.  This finding supports previous studies suggestin  
geopolitical strategic considerations were of greater importance to US economic 
aid decisionmakers during the Cold War than post-Cold War era (Meernik, 
Krueger, Poe 1998; Poe 1991).  On the other hand, the findings suggest that 
involvement in a dispute with the United States was of greater importance 




probability of a country passing the gatekeeping stage during the post-Cold War 
era and, as with the war on terror, the amount of economic aid it could expect.       
The pluralist-business explanation of economic aid allocations finds 
modest support in at the gatekeeping stage of the post-Cold War and war on 
terror models.  The trade partner variable is statistically significant (0.1 or 
higher) and positive for post-Cold War gatekeeping decisions, which probably 
reflects in part the United States’ efforts to provide trade and id to bolster 
former Eastern bloc market openings and democratic transitions (Huntington 
1991).  For example, Belarus in 1992 went from no trade with or aid from the 
United States during the Cold War to significant levels of trade and hundreds of 
millions of dollars in economic aid thereafter, as did numerous others, including 
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania.  However, the trade variable fails to perform as 
Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found during the Cold War and is negatively 
related to levels of aid in the post-Cold War and war on terror models. 
  Finally, the results of the partners variable provides strong but limited 
support for studying economic aid allocations to partners in the war on terror.  
The partners variable is positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) 
in the second-stage model.  While partners did not receive preferential treatment 
at the gatekeeping stage, the findings indicate that they tended on average to 












Table 5.2 reports the results for eras in military aid allocatins.  As with 
the economic aid models, I find support in the summary statistics for modeling 
eras in military aid allocations as a two-stage process.  The Wald test of rho is 
statistically significant across all models. And, again as with the economic aid 
models, I find that the cases passing the gatekeeping stage (uncensored 
observations) relative to those that did not (total observations) has grown in each 
era.  The “United States provides military assistance to US friends and allies to 
help them acquire US military equipment and training,” and more of th se 
friends and allies gained access to military aid annually after the onset of the war 
on terror than in either the Cold War or post-Cold War period (Tarnoff and 
Nowels 2005: 7).  But the post-9/11 growth in military aid allocations has been 
far less dramatic than for economic aid.  Whereas 56 percent and 64 percent of 
cases passed the gatekeeping stage during the Cold War and post-Cold War era, 
respectively, the percentage rose slightly to 67 percent (795/1189) during the 
war on terror.  This rather modest increase stands in contrast to the 
approximately threefold (21 percent) increase for economic aid since 9/11 and 
calls into question arguments that center on a dramatic expansion in the number 
of post-9/11 countries receiving aid.  On a conceptual note, this differential rate 
of passing the gatekeeping stage also tends to argues for modeling economic and 
military aid separately as the war on terror proceeds.  To be sure, Lebovic’s 




[economic + military] can obscure the role of interests and human needs in 
foreign policy as well as the means by which donors pursue their for gn policy 
objectives,” and the models presented in this chapter support his point (118).   
Turning to the actual model findings, I find that human rights 
considerations exerted a statistically weak but positive influece on Cold War 
gatekeeping decisions.  This finding provides the first (and only) tentative 
empirical support in this study for US decisionmakers’ adherence to the human 
rights provision and American exceptionalism in human rights promotion.  In so 
doing, it mirrors the findings of Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) and Poe 
(1991), and argues for the “importance of human rights practices primarily in 
the initial stages of military aid allocation decisions” (Meernik and Poe 1995: 
406). However, the human rights variable enjoys no such influence thereafer.  
Despite this initial encouraging finding, the variable is negative and statistically 
significant at the level of assistance stage.  Poe and Meernik first uncovered this 
rather paradoxical dual finding for the Cold War in their 1995 study. Meernik, 
Krueger, and Poe (1998) later found the same, and interpreted the finding as I do
now: “having cleared certain basic criteria regarding human rights [at the 
gatekeeping stage], states that make it into the pool of aid recipients are not 
penalized for those abuses they do commit” (79).  This negative relationship 
between human rights and military aid at the level of assistance stage in the Cold 
War model carries through to the post-Cold War model as well, though in the 
case of the latter the coefficient fails to achieve statistical significance.  As such, 




no kinder to the human rights-military aid linkage than the war on terror.  In 
both eras, human rights considerations would seem to be of little to no 
consequence to decisionmaking.  
  As for hypothesis 5, the war on terror did not bring a supposed era of 
human rights to an end in the case of military aid allocations.  If anything, the 
model results indicate that the post-Cold War era brought the only possible 
semblance of such an era—at the gatekeeping stage during the Cold War—to an 
end. I thus find no support for H5a-b (military).   
Despite the mostly disappointing results for the human rights variable, 
the secondary indicators of American exceptionalism fair somewhat better. As 
with past studies, the models indicate that US decisionmakers tended to consider 
recipient need (GDP per capita) when deciding whether to allocate a country 
military aid during the Cold War and war on terror (Meernik and Poe 1995; Poe 
1991; Lai 2003).  Interestingly, at the second stage recipient need became a non-
factor during the Cold War and even positively related to levels of military 
assistance thereafter.  Bahrain is a case in point; despite its rela ively high GDP 
per capita, US military aid began to flow—sometimes in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually—after the Cold War.  Level of democracy lso 
exerts a moderately statistically significant (0.05 level) and positive effect on 
military aid allocations after the Cold War, a partial replication of Meernik, 
Krueger, and Poe’s (1998) findings that suggest democracy promotion and 
stabilization became a military aid funding priority as the thr at of communism 




As for remaining control variables, the ally variable performed contrary 
to realist expectations at the gatekeeping stage in all era models.   Only at the 
level of assistance stage in the Cold War and post-Cold War models do s the 
variable exhibit a positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) 
relationship on military aid allocations that realism anticipates, which Poe (1991 
and 1992) also found.  I interpret this finding as once an ally made it past the 
gatekeeping stage, where membership was of no advantage or even a 
disadvantage, it found enormous favor thereafter and was allocated military aid 
to ensure it could meet its security-related obligations.  The coefficient on the 
Cold War ally variable—one of the largest thus far encountered at the level of 
assistance stage—indicates US decisionmakers allocated allies that made it past 
the gatekeeping stage a staggering $220 million more military aid than non-
allies, ceteris paribus.  Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, stand out as strong 
examples on this count, as they “were allocated greater levels of aid than all 
other countries in the world save for Egypt and Israel” through the 1980s (Poe 
and Meernik 1995: 407).  This advantage began to fade in post-Cold War era 
and ended with the onset of the war on terror, according to my findings.  
Countries adjacent to a US-designated threat found similar favor, though in 
lesser amounts, during the post-Cold War only.  Sharing a border with a US-
designated threat in the form of a rogue regime or state sponsor f te rorism 
during the post-Cold War garnered countries increased military aid.  Thereafter, 





TABLE 5.2     Human Rights and US Military Aid Allocations by Era 
    
  
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating military aid (gatekeeping 
stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage), 1977-2008. 
  
Gatekeeping Stage 
(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 
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Partners in War on 
Terror 
---b ---b .492*** 
(.176) 
---b ---b 1.69*** 
(.235) 
























   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).   Time dummies omitted.   
---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  ---b Only applicable to the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror models.  
Cold War: total obs. = 1297. Uncensored obs. = 737. Rho = -.63.  Wald test of rho = 0.0002. Log likelihood = -1937.76.   
Post-Cold War: total obs. = 1369. Uncensored obs. = 874. Rho = -.27.  Wald test of rho = 0.007. Log likelihood = -2140.63.   





Partners not only gained access to military aid more readily but also were 
allocated more at the level of assistance stage.  Whereas population failed to 
perform at the gatekeeping stage as realists anticipate, and generally at the level 
of assistance stage as well, the dispute variable performed as xpected.  Not 
surprisingly, US decisionmakers were strongly disinclined to provide countries 
engaged in a dispute with the United States access to military a d.    Finally, and 
in stark contrast to realist-oriented explanation, the models provide no support 
for the pluralist-business explanation of military aid allocations.    
 
Conclusion  
  If the war on terror may be considered an emerging era in US foreign 
aid allocations, as some content and my analysis suggests, the findings of this 
chapter suggest that the negative relationship between human rights and 
economic aid observed in this new era has more in common with previous eras 
than not.  Nevertheless, American exceptionalism found strong support in the
overall performance of GDP per capita and democracy variable whilethe realist 
and pluralist-business explanation of economic aid allocations found only weak 
and occasional support.  As for military aid, the results indicate that human 
rights considerations did not exert a statistically significant influence on 
allocations during the war on terror.  Rather, it did so only during the Cold War 
and, even then, with mixed results.  Self-serving donor interests in the guise or 
realist-oriented variables were less influential in the economic aid models than 
the military aid.  The findings indicate that disputes with the United States were 




era, with allies, countries bordering a US-designated threat, and partners in the 
war on terror garnering increased amounts of military aid.   For a closer look at 
the last group, partners in the war on terror, I now turn to Chapter 6.    




Chapter 6: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid 





  In this, the third and final empirical chapter, I examine the G.W. Bush 
administration’s foreign aid allocations as a single quantitative case study, 
focusing on economic and military aid allocations to partner countries “with us” 
and non-partners that were “against us” in the war on terror (Bush 2002).  
Having demonstrated in the previous chapter that partners were a statistically 
significant grouping of countries in all but economic aid gatekeeping decisions 
and that this group garnered greater amounts of economic and military a d 
during the era of the war on terror because of this partnership, I nowsearch for 
evidence of whether partners in the war on terror benefited froma double 
standard in US human rights policy.  This double standard may be stated as: 
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act continued to guide aid allocations to 
non-partners, ensuring that human rights considerations played their 
Congressionally-mandated role in the process, but during allocations to partners 
US foreign aid decisionmakers set aside this mandate to ensure aid reached the 
60 or so countries supporting the war on terror.   
In search of this possible double standard, I turn in the next section to the 
results for the economic aid models.  The presentation of findings proceeds 




attention to a modeling issue: the first relates to the exclusion of the ally variable 
in all non-partner models and dispute variable in the partners model and the 
second an instrumental variable change in the military aid model f r partners.  
On September 12, 2001, NATO declared—consistent with Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty—that it considered the terrorist attacks on the United States to 
be an attack against all member-countries (NATO 2010).  Other countries allied 
with the United States, including major non-NATO allies, followed suit in 
expressing support for the war.  As a consequence, the ally variable h s been 
dropped from the non-partners models since no allies were non-partners in the 
war.  The instrument change in the partners model arises for a simil r situation.  
Because no partners were engaged in a dispute with the United States, the 
dispute variable could not serve as an instrumental variable.  However, as with 
Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) found in their analysis of aid-givin  by 
era, the ally variable proved a theoretically defensible and methodologically 
credible substitution.  Bearing these changes in mind, I discuss in the next 
section economic allocations to the two groups.   
      
Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations to 
Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror  
 
  Looking at the model statistics at the bottom of Table 6.1 highlights 
an interesting finding.  The G.W. Bush administration tended to allocate 
economic aid to a greater percentage of non-partners than partners.  Ninety-three 




allocation process as opposed to 80 percent (359/446) of the partner cases.48  In 
the case of the latter, inspection of the data indicates the 20 percent that failed to 
pass the gatekeeping stage typically were wealthy Western European partners.  
Yet US decisionmakers during this period did begin to allocate economic aid—
in some cases for the first time ever—to wealthy Western democracies that also 
happen to be partner in the war on terror (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005).  Canada 
and Belgium are two such examples drawn from the partners dataset.  Thus, the 
G.W. Bush administration said “yes” at the gatekeeping stage to allocating some 
level of economic aid to even the wealthiest partners in the war on terror at 
times.  Nevertheless, if one’s arguments about the war on terror under the G.W. 
Bush administration hinges on partners’ securing greater access to conomic aid 
than non-partners, the summary statistics suggest the premise is flawed.         
 Turning first to the probit estimates for the prospects that a partner in 
the war on terror would pass the gatekeeping stage, located in the first column of 
Table 6.1, indicates human rights considerations failed to influence gatekeeping 
decisions for partners and non-partners alike.  American exceptionalism is thus 
on shaky empirical ground in both case, a dilemma that is further exacerbated by 
the performance of the human rights variable at the level of assist nce stage.49  
                                                
48  With all but seven percent of non-partner cases admitted to the economic aid pool, one has to 
wonder if US decisionmakers propensity under the G.W. Bush administration for saying “yes” 
so often at some point might erode the methodological utility—as opposed to theoretical 
justification—for employing Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage decision-making 
process.  Nevertheless, the Wald test of rho supports modeling economic aid allocations to 
partners and non-partners as a two-stage process.    
49 The single-stage (OLS) check on the partners and no-partners level of assistance allocations 
produced substantially similar results as the Heckman (1979) models.  The human rights 
variables were negative and statistically significant, though the magnitude of the coefficients did 
decline in both, including by more than half in thepartners model.  Thus, while I can be 




As with the gatekeeping stage, the human rights variable carri s  negative sign.  
However, at the level of assistance stage the variable is stat tical significance 
(.05 level or greater) in both models.  The findings lead me to accept H6a 
(economic), since partners’ human rights records failed to influence their 
prospects of receiving aid.  However, I reject H6b (economic), not because 
human rights considerations had the positive influence I expected but rather a 
negative relationship to levels of assistance.   
The substantive effects reported in the fifth row of Table 6.1.1 indicate 
that a partner country with the worst human rights score of “1” could expected 
an initial predicted economic aid allocation of $809 million dollars, a taggering 
99 percent more than partners making the hypothetical switch to thebest score 
of “5.”  In addition, looking at the point-to-point changes in the human rights 
variable (recorded in rows 1-4) indicates that every one-point improvement on 
my inverted PTS on average cut a partner’s predicted economic aid amount by 
about 74 percent.  Most of these predicted aid dollars flowed to post-invaio  
Afghanistan and Iraq, by far the largest to any partners in the war on terror.  
While allocations to the two are regarded in this study as an integral part of the 
US strategy for winning the war on terror, since they are the outgrow h of a 
policy aimed at denying international terrorists a foothold in either country, a 
closer look at allocations to Afghanistan and Iraq is revealing.  Since becoming 
partners in the war on terror, economic aid to both countries soared annually 
from $500+ million to Afghanistan to in the billions for Iraq.  However, most 
                                                                                                                                                 
hypotheses—the magnitude of the coefficient should be viewed with some reservation, 
depending on whether one agrees that that two-stage mod l is the most appropriate method for 




remaining partners receiving aid took home approximately $100 million 
annually.   
The performance of the human rights variable in the non-partners model 
also proves intriguing.  One might anticipate based on the findings mention d 
above that partner allocations were responsible for the negative relationship 
between human rights and economic aid at the post-9/11 level of assistance 
stage, but the non-partner findings suggest otherwise. As with partners, the 
results indicate human rights did not influence gatekeeping decisions and were 
statistically significant and negatively related to level of assistance decisions.  
The implication is that US decisionmakers did not hold non-partners to a higher 
standard of respect for human rights than partners during the economi aid 
allocation process.  I therefore reject H7 a-b (economic).  As noted in Table 
6.1.1, the substantive effects of the human rights variable suggest that non-
partners with a score of “1” could on average expect to receive substantially less 
in predicted economic aid than their partner counterparts.  However, once 
Afghanistan and Iraq are removed from among the partners, the iniial predicted 
economic aid allocation to non-partners is comparable to that of partners.  
In looking to the control variables, recipient need (GDP per capita) once 
again provides strong and consistent support for American exceptionalism at the 
gatekeeping stage.   Poorer partners and non-partners were more likely to gain 
access to economic aid. One plausible interpretation for this finding in the case 
of partners is that the G.W. Bush administration chose not to reward partners 




gatekeeping stages whose counterterrorism capabilities lagged behin  others due 
to lack of resources.  The data suggests partners from Kenya and Uganda to 
Mongolia are prime examples.  Interestingly, only in the non-partners model at 
the level of assistance stage did US decisionmakers extend increased aid to 
countries with higher levels of democracy.     
Looking further down Table 6.1 shows the realist-oriented variables 
fared poorly in the partners and non-partners models.  Non-partners engaged in a 
dispute with the United States could expect to pass the gatekeeping stage less 
and receive less aid than countries engaged in no such dispute, but otherwise 
realist explanations of economic aid giving fall flat.  The performance of the 
threat variable is particularly problematic for realism.  One would expect 
partners assisting in the war on terror that also shared a land border with US-
designated rogue stage, state sponsor of terror, or both to be more likely than 
others to gain access to US economic aid and more of it, all else b ing equal.  
But this is not the case, and only at the level of assistance stag is the coefficient 
positive—though still statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the pluralist-
business explanation of aid allocations receives a modest boost in the guise of a 
positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) coefficient for the trade 
partner variable in the partners model.  Higher levels of trade with the United 
States afforded partners greater access to economic aid, ceteris paribus, though 
the results suggest this access did not precipitate allocations decisions that led to 






TABLE 6.1     Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners 
                         in the War on Terror   
   
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid 




(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 










































































Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).  
 ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  ---b Dropped because all allies were partners in the war on terror.   
---c Dropped because no partners engaged in dispute with Un ed States. 
Partners: total obs. = 446. Uncensored obs. = 359. Rho = -.76.  Wald test of rho = .005. Log likelihood = -757.14.   







Table 6.1.1   The Substantive Effect of Human Rights on the Predicted Values of Economic Aid Allocations to 
Partners and Non-partners in the War on Terror     
  






Initial predicted  
economic aid amount 
(b)  
Predicted economic aid 
amount after variable 
change 
(c)  
Change in predicted 
economic aid amount,  
b-a 
(d)  
Percentage change in 
predicted amount of 
economic aid,  c/a 
Partners 
   Human Rights,  













       Change 2 to 3 213.8 56.5 -157.3 -74% 
       Change 3 to 4 56.5 14.9 -41.5 -75% 
       Change 4 to 5 14.9 3.9 -11 -73% 
      Total change 1 to 5 809 3.9 -805 -99% 
Non-partners 
   Human Rights,  













       Change 2 to 3 64.5 37.4 -27.1 -43% 
       Change 3 to 4 37.4 21.6 -15.7 -43% 
       Change 4 to 5 21.6 12.4 -9.1 -44% 
      Total change 1 to 5 110.9 12.4 -98.5 -89% 
  
Note: Values derived from the Partners/non-partners models pr sented in Table 6.1. Values have been converted in o constant millions of US 
dollars and are calculated for those countries passing the initial gatekeeping stage of the allocation process that were allocated some level of 
assistance (uncensored observations).   Predicted amounts and percentage were calculated holding explanatory variables constant while 




Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Military Aid Allocations to 
Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror 
 
 
In the final analysis of this last empirical chapter, I focus on the G.W. 
Bush administration’s military aid allocations to partners and non-partners in the 
war on terror.  As was the case with economic aid, decisionmakers in the post-
9/11 environment moved quickly to increase or, if previously denied, reestablish 
military aid flows to countries deemed capable of advancing the war (Tarnoff 
and Nowels 2005; Gabelnick 2002).50  US decisionmakers once again allocated 
military aid to countries that had previously been denied US military assistance 
because of their poor human rights record—most notably, Pakistan and 
Indonesia—after they pledge to support the war on terror (Apodaca 2006).  
Unlike in the economic aid model, where the percentage of non-partner cases
allocated aid was 13 percent higher than that of partners, the percentage of cases 
allocated military aid is more evenly split between the groups than many would 
expect.  Non-partners passed the gatekeeping stage at a rate of 67 percent 
(499/743) compared to 66 percent (296/446) for partners.  This suggests partners 
were not allocated military aid significantly more often than non-partners just 
for being “with us”—the United States—in the war on terror.   
As for the actual model findings, I open the examination by noting that 
Apodaca (2005) argues the G.W. Bush administration sidestepped Section 502B 
when allocating military aid to “frontline allies in the fight against terrorism” 
                                                
50 Bear in mind, however, economic aid allocations eaily outstrip military aid allocations 
despite the post-9/11 increase in the latter.  Tarnoff and Lawson (2009) report that US military 
obligations as a share of total aid obligations peaked at 42 percent in 1984 but has since been in 




and, in so doing, provided numerous countries with poor human rights scores aid 
(73).    She cites a number of examples, including Pakistan, and in follow- n 
work, Armenia and Azerbaijan (2006).  The human rights variable at the 
gatekeeping stage tends to support her analysis, owing to the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient.  At the level of assistance stage, however, 
human rights considerations seemingly had little impact on decisionmaki g as 
most critics claim.51  I thus reject H6a (military) and accept H6b (military) since 
human rights considerations failed to influence aid allocations.  
Looking at the non-partners model, respect for human rights is positively 
related to the initial decision to allocate military aid.  However, the human rights 
variable fails to achieve statistical significance at this stage.  I thus find that the 
G.W. Bush administration did not use human rights behavior as a basis for the 
initial decision to extend military aid to this group.  I am consequently led to 
reject H7a-b (military) and conclude that there was no human rights double-
standard for partners and non-partners in the war on terror.  Neither partners nor 
non-partners with better human rights records found favor during the military 
aid allocation process under the G.W. Bush administration.  Conversely, 
decisionmakers did not penalize poor human rights performance in both groups.  
American exceptionalism thus finds no support in military aid allocati ns to 
partners and non-partners.     
                                                
51 As with previous models, the OLS single-stage equation for the level of assistance stage 
produced similar results into terms of the statistical nsignificance of the coefficients.  However, 
in the case of non-partners, the sign on the coeffici nt turned positive—but again remained 






TABLE 6.2     Human Rights and US Military Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners 
                         in the War on Terror   
   
Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating military aid 




(Probit Selection Models) 
 
Level of Assistance Stage 














































Dispute ---b -7.65*** 
(.257) 
---b ---a 
























   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).  
 ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  ---b Dropped because no partners engaged in dispute with Un ed States.  
---c Dropped because all allies were partners in the war on terror. 
Partners: total obs. = 446. Uncensored obs. = 296. Rho = -.75.  Wald test of rho = .01. Log likelihood = -608.62    




Looking down the list of control variables, American exceptionalism a  an 
explanation of US military aid allocations meets with mixed results.  Support 
arrives only at the gatekeeping stage, where the results indicate US 
decisionmakers favored poorer non-partners, most of which the data in ic tes 
are in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.    Partners and non-partners with 
higher levels of democracy also had better prospects of securing aid, though the 
variable’s weak statistical significance (0.1 level) in both models suggests this is 
best regarded as a tentative finding.  In contrast, realist-oriented variables have a 
stronger showing in the military than economic aid models for partners and non-
partner in the war on terror.  US allies who were partners weremor  likely to 
gain access to military aid than non-allied partners and non-partners with a 
dispute less likely to gain access.  Interestingly, despite the transnational 
character of international terrorism, partners adjacent to more traditionally 
defined US-designate threats like rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism 
garnered more military aid than others.  The coefficient indicates partners that 
also shared a border with one or more threats—such as Turkey (bordering Iran 
and Syria)—could expect to receive an average $25 million more in predicted 
military aid annually that other partners.  The results also indicate more 
populous non-partners could expect greater amounts of aid as well, ceteris 
paribus.  Finally, I also find weak statistical support (0.1 level) for the pluralist-
business explanation of US military aid allocations, at least in the case of 
amounts of aid allocated to partners in the war on terror, though the influence of 






  In this final empirical chapter I examined economic and military aid 
allocated under the G.W. Bush administration to partners and non-partners in the 
war on terror.  I found no empirical support for critics’ claims of a human rights 
double standard between partners and non-partners in the war on terror; human
rights considerations failed to influence gatekeeping decisions and were
negatively related to levels of assistance decisions for both groups in the 
economic aid models.  As for the military aid models, human rights 
considerations typically failed to influence decisions; only in thecase of 
gatekeeping decisions for non-partners did the human rights variable c rry the 
positive sign I expected.  Taken together, these findings cast considerable doubt 
on American exceptionalism in the guise of human rights promotion and, by 
extension, the efficacy of the human rights provision for allocations t  non-
partners and partners in the war on terror.   Any claim of American 
exceptionalism derived from my models in this chapter thus ride on the 
performance of the GDP per capita and level of democracy variable.        
  Having completed the empirical analyses and evaluated the 
hypotheses for this and the previous two chapters, I now summarize thes












In this final chapter I summarize the empirical findings of this study.  
The summary begins with a table that provides a hypothesis-by-hypothesis 
synopsis of the findings from Chapter 4-6.  Rather than rehearse the findings 
again, I focus here on translating them into exploratory answers to the research 
questions that spurred this study as outlined in Chapter 1.  In answerig these 
questions, my goal is to begin to fill in some of the pieces of the res arch puzzle 
surrounding the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid during 
the war on terror that this analysis has uncovered.   Having fulfilled my primary 
goal, I then examine how this study speaks to our secondary goal of evaluating 
the relative utility of the three main theoretical orientations employed by 
scholars studying human and US foreign aid.  I offer suggestions for future 
researchers that promise to build on the findings of this study and advance our 
understanding of US foreign aid decision-making during the war on terror 
before concluding with some final words on American exceptionalism. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
  Table 7.1 highlights the findings for the economic and military aid 
decision-making models constructed for this study by hypothesis.  Reflecting on 
the research questions, I may now offer a number of answers based on our 




conclude with a fair degree of confidence that human rights considerations have 
exhibited a negative relationship with economic aid allocations since the onset 
of the war on terror.  This runs counter to Section 502B requirements and, 
consequently, my expectations of American exceptionalism in the form of 
human rights promotion.  Interestingly, it also leads me to reject most of the 
critics’ claims—embodied in the hypotheses—regarding the irrelevancy of 
human rights considerations in the post-9/11 environment (though obviously not 
for the reasons I had anticipated).  On their face, then, the findings suggest that 
the G.W. Bush administration’s economic aid allocation decisions were 
predicated at both stages on the “extraordinary circumstances” of the war on 
terror.  But the negative relationship between human rights and economic aid 
observed during the war on terror was not a first.  I also found this negative 
relationship between human rights and aid under previous administrations and in 
previous eras at the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the allocation 
process.  The findings indicate the same cannot be said of the G.W. Bush 
administration’s military aid allocations, however, where human rights failed to 
influence allocation decisions.  But this was no first either.  Only at the 
gatekeeping stage in the Cold War model did the human rights variable exhibit a 
positive relationship with military aid decisionmaking.  I am thus left to 
conclude that human rights have been for the most part a rhetorical refrain rather 
than a policy reality of economic and military aid-giving. 
If extraordinary circumstances are meant to apply on a case-by-case 




might they have become the norm for economic aid allocations under the G.W. 
Bush administration?  The findings of this study highlight one such possibility.  
Section 502B and other human rights provisions are “shot through” with legally-
permissible exceptions, as previously mentioned, one of which is the “needy 
people” clause.  Congress originally included such clauses to pacify 
Congresspersons who believed that denying impoverished people economic aid 
because the regime ruling over them engages in human rights abuses mad  life 
doubly difficult (Apodaca 2006).  Recall, that in reframing the rationale for 
economic aid, the G.W. Bush administration declared global poverty a “root
cause” of terrorism and its alleviation a primary goal of the US economic aid 
program.  And, indeed, I did find that recipient need (GDP per capita) played  
significant role in economic aid allocations under his administration.  Whether 
the G.W. Bush administration adopted this tack in a genuine effort to reduce 
poverty or political maneuver to sidestep Section 502B requirements is an open 
question I hope will be an ongoing topic of debate for IR and human rights 
scholars who may read this study.  Interestingly, given the poor performance of 
the human rights and strong performance of the need variable across all 
administrations, it appears as though this is an open question for previous 
administrations too.  As such, it may be that in its reframing of aid the G.W. 
Bush administration was updating and articulating for the age of terr r a well-
worn refrain and emphasis on addressing need in US economic aid allocations.  
This possibility, along with the fairly consistent performance of the democracy 




relationship between human rights and economic aid.  Why the negative 
relationship?  In short, it appears as though addressing need and promoting 
democracy overshadow human rights considerations during the decisionmak ng 
process, which may lead US decisionmakers to allocate aid to regimes with poor 
human rights records for the sake of advancing these “higher” priorities.  On a 
final point, and for my part, I see little reason why the US economic aid program 
would be incapable of promoting better human rights practices while reducing 
global poverty (and for that matter promoting democracy) simultaneously.  
Packaging these liberal values into a cohesive aid policy rather than continuing 
to go about their promotion piecemeal seems a viable and, heretofore, unused 
strategy. 
When I examined the war on terror as a new era in US foreign aid 
allocations, which empirical evidence presented in this study suggests is 
justified, I found that human rights considerations fared no better or worse than 
in the post-Cold War era.  Human rights have been negatively related to 
economic aid since the post-Cold War era and failed to influence military aid 
allocations since then as well.  The supposed “peace dividend,” which I and
other proponents of American exceptionalism had hoped would boost the 
influence of human rights considerations in the post-Cold War period, failed to 







Table 7.1     Summary of Findings by Hypothesis  
 
  
US Economic Aid 
Allocations 
 












Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations by the G.W. Bush 
Administration 
  
Hypotheses 1a-b: After 9/11, human rights considerations had no 
significant influence on administration decisions about (a) which 









Hypotheses 2a-b: The failure of human rights considerations to 
influence US foreign aid allocations consistent with the human rights 
provision’s mandate (and my own expectations) under the G.W. Bush 
administration at the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage










Hypotheses 3a-b:  In contrast to the G.W. Bush administration, as the 
human rights record of a country improved, the (a) probability of it 
receiving aid and (b) the amount it could expect to receive increased 









Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations in the Era of the War 
on Terror  
  
Hypotheses 4a-b: In contrast to the war on terror, during the 












(a) prospects of a country receiving aid and (b) more of it. 
Hypotheses 5a-b: The war on terror ended positive era in the human 
rights-foreign aid linkage, one that subsumes the post-Cold War and 










Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-
partners in the War on Terror 
  
Hypotheses 6a-b: Human rights considerations failed to influence 
the (a) prospects of a partner receiving aid and (c) the amount 









Hypotheses 7a-b: In contrast to partners in the war on terror, US 
decisionmakers held non-partners accountable for their human rights 
practices such that those failing to respect human rights were (a) less 












  Moreover, the findings indicate that only during Cold War military aid 
allocations and at the gatekeeping stage did human rights exert a positive but 
weakly significant influence on the process.  On balance, the models tend to 
suggest that military aid allocations are dominated by considerations of national 
security and threat perception with human rights considerations only 
occasionally influencing the process.  It thus seems safe to conclude that the war 
on terror did not cut short an era of human rights promotion in US foreign aid 
decisionmaking.  On the contrary, the findings indicate that era has yet to begin!  
  Finally, I found that respect for human rights was negatively related 
to levels of economic aid for partners and non-partners in the war on terr r and 
likewise for partners in the military aid models. Thus, I found no support for the 
argument that there was a human rights double standard at work under the G.W. 
Bush administration; those countries that were “against us” during the war on 
terror were not held to a higher human rights standard—consistent with the 
human rights provision.  On the contrary, they were seemingly held to the same 




  As for the secondary goal of this study, my own rather pragmatic 
brand of American exceptionalism led me to expect more mixed results on the 
relationship between human rights and US foreign aid during the war on terror 
than either the pure variant of American exceptionalism or any of the arguments 
that spurred this inquiry would admit.  My expectations were grounded in the 




the larger US foreign policy decisionmaking process, with all the power 
struggles, competing claims, inconsistencies, and contradictions that are bound 
to emerge when major foreign policy players clash (Hinckley 1994; Meernik, 
Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca 2006).  While the models bore out the utility 
of this assumption, they proved a disappointment for my expectations of 
American exceptionalism.  I had hoped that my version of American 
exceptionalism—and, in truth, a purer one—would find support in the empirical 
models.  Recipient need (GDP per capita), level of democracy and, in at least 
one model, human rights performed as expected, but for the most part the human 
rights variable fell short of my expectations and—owing to the negative sign it 
often carried—performed worse than even critics of the war on terror imagined. 
I thus conclude that American exceptionalism survived the war on terror, but in 
a diminished version sustained only by the importance to decisionmakers of 
addressing recipient need and promoting democracy abroad.   
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
During the course of this study a number of potentially fruitful research 
avenues arose that I had to set aside as suggestions for future research.  Here, I 
offer two sets of suggestions.  The first focuses on empirical research related to 
US foreign aid allocations as the war on terror progresses the second on 
conceptual and methodological issues that future researchers may want to bear 
in mind in exploring this research puzzle.  On the first count, a detiled 
examination of regional variation and case studies in aid allocation ppears in 




importance as the war on terror progresses.  The Middle East is the obvious 
example.  An analysis of US foreign aid allocations to the region, including to 
partners in the war on terror in each region, seems an appropriate next step in 
advancing the exploratory findings of this study.  Research that promises to 
provide additional insights into whether the G.W. Bush administration’s aid 
allocations were the first in an emerging era also seems a worthwhile avenue for 
further exploration.  Throwing open the “black box” of US politics and 
demonstrating how its contents influence the human rights-US foreign aid 
linkage is a mostly unexplored research avenue that remains wide open.  This 
study opened that box in the preliminary analysis, and as noted in Chapter 3, 
constructed models that included variables tapping the annual US budget deficit 
and years in which the president and congress were of opposite parties, bo h of 
which presumably constrain the US foreign aid allocations.  However, neither 
variable produced particularly interesting results and were dropped from the 
study.  Yet it is clear from various presidential budgetary requests and 
Congressional deliberations examined in preparation for this study that US 
domestic considerations and party politics play a significant role in foreign aid 
allocations and the impact of human rights on the decisionmaking process.  The 
significance of these considerations seemingly begs for a two-level linkage 
model that combines domestic and international variables and explores their 
interaction and relative influence in the allocation process. Another avenue to 
consider is alternative conceptualizations of the dependent variable.  On  could 




nevertheless theoretically and methodologically defensible, groupings of aid 
programs.  The G.W. Bush administration’s Foreign Assistance Framework 
seems a reasonable starting point.  Under this framework, the administrat on 
conceptualized foreign aid as promoting five primary objectives: encouraging 
recipient countries to govern justly and democratically; to invest in people; to 
promote economic growth; to improve living conditions for those in need; and to 
ensure peace and security.52  The Framework documents indicate that the Bush 
administration grouped aid programs aimed at advancing the war on terr r—
both economic and military aid programs—almost exclusively in the peace and 
security category.  Thus, an analysis of the relationship between human rights 
and “peace and security” aid could further inform our understanding of aid 
allocations during the war on terror and reenergize the analysis of programmatic 
aid.   
On the second set of more process-oriented suggestions, I offer a 
cautionary tale to future researchers.  During the preliminary analysis phase of 
this study, it became clear that much—frankly, too much—of model output on 
the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid depends on the 
sample of countries and years one chooses to collect data on and analyze.  The 
robustness checks I performed in Chapter 3 highlight this point, as did 
preliminary analysis on various regional subsets.  On that note, the human rights 
variable in some preliminary (mostly regional) models “flipped” signs as I 
moved specific countries and groups of countries in select organizations—such 
                                                
52 The Framework is available online at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
88433.pdf. The primacy of counterterrorism for peace and security is illustrated online at 




as the OECD and NATO—in and out of the sample.  The variable also changed 
statistical significance in some instances.  These finding held ev n after I logged 
the second-stage dependent variables in preparation for use in my f al models, 
which is widely assumed to smooth the extremes in foreign aid allocations and 
thereby reduce the influence of outliers.  This suggests future researchers—
when in doubt—should opt as I did to employ a “global” sample of countries, 
since all (even wealthy democracies) are regarded as potential aid recipients, 
according to USAID, and identified as such in the Greenbook.  In any event, 
these same researchers would be well advised to carefully consider their 
samples, have a theoretical basis for the retention or removal of any cases, and 
proceed with caution—shying away from broad generalizations or speculation—
when discussing their findings.  Finally, it is worth noting that this study 
followed others in demonstrating the general theoretical and methodological 
utility and durability of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage 





Having offered some suggestions for future research, I opt to revisit 
American exceptionalism and conclude on a theoretical note.  Many deride 
American exceptionalism as a myth.   In their view, its proponents—particularly 
those who adhere to a belief that the United States is a “shining city upon a 
hill”—are at best naïve and at worst delusional (Reagan 1989).   In one sense, 




exceptionalism with ample empirical ammunition.  Human rights considerations 
typically failed or had the opposite effect on aid allocations as American 
exceptionalism predicted.  Truth be told, these findings have left me to 
contemplate whether those of the study I coauthored in 1994—which 
demonstrated a positive relationship between human rights and US foreign aid 
and informs my pragmatic American exceptionalism—were sample-bound.  Yet 
the findings of this study also indicate that human rights considerations exerted a 
positive influence on gatekeeping decisions during Cold War military aid 
allocations.  For students of US foreign aid such paradoxes—the significance 
and positive influence of human rights in one instance and the opposite 
elsewhere—are hallmarks of the allocation process.  As Apodaca (2006) puts it, 
the “evolution of the United States’ human rights policy can best be understood 
as a succession of paradoxes and not as a simple linear advancement” (191).    If 
American exceptionalism and the human rights provision are to serve as guiding 
principles for the US foreign aid program moving forward, and we are to r solve 
such paradoxes, I return to the begin of this study—to the moral entrepreneurs 
who have been and can continue to be agents for positive change.  America’s 
exceptionalism lies not in the human rights provision, per se, but in the 
willingness of ordinary Americans to demand that our elected repres ntatives 
embrace this exceptionalism and consistently hold recipients of US foreign aid 
accountable for their human rights record.       








Appendix 3.1: Partners in the War on Terror, 2001-2008 
 












Czech Republic, 2001 
Denmark, 2001 
Djibouti, 2002 
Dominican Republic, 2003  
Egypt, 2001 

























Morocco, 2001  
Nepal, 2002-05 
Netherlands, 2001 


















Ukraine, 2001  










Appendix 3.2: Communist Countries, Rogue Regimes, and State 
Sponsors of Terrorism 
 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
 Members: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany (east), 
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Vietnam.  Observers: 
Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, Laos, Nicaragua, North Korea, Vietnam, 
Yemen (south), Yugoslavia. 
 
Rogue Regimes 
 Cuba, Iran (1991-2008), Iraq (1991-2003), Libya (1991-2005), North 
Korea (1991-2008), Sudan (1991-2001), Syria (1991 to present) 
 
State Sponsors of Terrorism 
 Cuba (1982-2008), Iran (1984-2008), Sudan (1993-2001), Syria (1979-


























Appendix 3.3: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables 
 
                         | PTS         GDP      Ally      Pop      Dispute   Polity    Threat   Trade    Partners 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PTS                 |   1.0000 
GDP                 |   0.4837   1.0000 
Ally                   |   0.2794   0.5149   1.0000 
Pop                  |  -0.3559  -0.0348   0.2123   1.0000 
Dispute            |  -0.1792  -0.0501  -0.0839   0.0815   1.0000 
Polity               |   0.3300   0.4526   0.3720   0.0845  -0.1964   1.0000 
Threat              |  -0.0797   0.0958   0.2155   0.0880  -0.0613   0.0345   1.0000 
Trade              |    0.0961   0.6917   0.4402   .5388  -0.1231   0.4067   0.0825   1.0000 
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